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FACTS ON FILE
WORLD NEWS DIGEST WITH INDEX

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WORLD AFFAIRS

EUROPE

Senate Ratifies Paris Pacts

U.S. Action Spurs 'Big 4' Talk

The U.S. Senate voted by 76-2 Apr. 1 to ratify the Paris agreements to set up an armed, sovereign West Germany within NATO.

The 2 pacts subject to U.S. approval (on sovereignty & NATO membership for Germany) were opposed only by Sens. William Langer (R., N.D.) & George W. Malone (R., Nev.). Langer, who also had voted "no" when the Senate Forgn. Relations Com. approved the pacts, 14-1, Mar. 31, said they would fail, as had the Allies' plans to guarantee world peace after World War I. Malone opposed any alliance in which the U.S. agreed to defend a nation over which it had "no control." [See pp. 97C2, 50C2, 52C2]

Pacts Need 2 Ratifications

The one-chamber Luxembourg Parliament ratified Apr. 6 by 48-3 the Paris pacts, including the agreement to establish a 12-division German force under the Western European Union. The Belgian Senate approved the pacts same day by 142-2 (one abstention). Only Denmark & the Netherlands had yet to complete parliamentary action on the agreements. [See pp. 97E1, 26E3]

High-Level Talks Urged

Chrmn. Walter F. George (D., Ga.) of the Senate Forgn. Relations Com. said Apr. 1 the Paris treaties carried some "practical workable safeguards" against resurgent German militarism. He said the pacts "improve the chances for a Big 4, or a Big 5, meeting that will produce something more constructive & helpful than stalemate & propaganda." [See p. 97C3]

George said Apr. 3 he would like to see Germany included in big-power talks, although he recognized there were some "difficulties" to overcome. He said it was "highly important" that a top-level conference be held soon even if the Soviets refused to take part, but he believed a meeting with the USSR was preferable & possible. "We are unable to proceed very far toward peace in the world situation today," George said. If the Russians don't join top-level talks, he added, the heads of Western Govts. still must meet to "understand each other & reach a measure of unity before any hopeful approach can be made to a re-examination of our problems."

Sen. Alexander Wiley (R., Wis.), senior Republican on the Senate Forgn. Relations Com., also advocated inclusion of Germany in a big-power meeting. Speaking on *Face the Nation* (CBS-TV) Apr. 3, he called Germany "the most vital & dynamic of the European powers." [See p. 43E1]

U. S. State Secy. John Foster Dulles told his news conference Apr. 5 that a Big 4 meeting was unlikely until after the June UN meeting in San Francisco to review the UN charter. He said there might be a "little preliminary exchange of views" among the Western powers at the meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Council in May. [See p. 97D3]

British Forgn. Secy. Sir Anthony Eden, speaking in Newcastle Mar. 31, said "there exist elements of what could be successful negotiation (with the USSR) if we give each other time & apply ourselves." He expressed belief that patient negotiations would solve major East-West differences. [See p. 97D3]

In an interview granted to Moscow *Pravda* (& reprinted Apr. 2 in the French Communist daily *L'Humanité*), French Premier Edgar Faure called Russia's "positive" reaction to Big 4-talk proposals [see p. 97E2] "a very important favorable fact" and said "the legitimate security needs" of each country would have to be considered in relaxing world tension.

West German Forgn. Secy. Walter Hallstein revived Apr. 4 Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's suggestion for a European security system that would guarantee Soviet security without weakening the West. [See Vol. XIV, p. 361F2]

Reds Reassert Pact Opposition

The Soviet weekly *New Times* contradicted Apr. 2 Western speculation that the USSR was reconciled to the Paris agreement on rearmament of West Germany. *Pravda* said same day "it is still possible to delay the course of events." [See pp. 97C1, E2, 91B3]

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Week in Headlines

International

Churchill retired as British Prime Minister in favor of Eden.
U.S. Senate ratified Paris Pacts.
Red China announced purge of Manchurian, Shanghai CP leaders.
German Reds imposed huge toll increase on West Berlin trucks.
Senate Democratic group sought bar against U.S. defense of China's off-shore islands.
Dulles delayed Japanese parley.

United States

Stassen clashed with Senators over Pakistan grain elevators.
UAW authorized strike fund to back drive for annual wage.
Joints Chiefs gave Congress views on military manpower cut.
Daley elected Chicago Mayor.
Died: newspaper publishers Robert McCormick, Joseph Pulitzer.

Reds Raise Berlin Tolls

The East German Govt. imposed an 11-fold increase on road tolls into West Berlin at midnight Mar. 31, but truck traffic—which brought in 44% of West Berlin's supplies—continued on the 110-mi. superhighway connecting West Berlin with Helmstedt, West Germany. Toll for a round trip rose from $5 to $55. The West Berlin Govt. allocated more than $250,000 Mar. 31 to reimburse truckers for the new tolls, which were protested Apr. 1 by the U.S., British & French High Commissioners in a letter to the Soviet Commissioner.

The Communists had said the higher tolls were needed to raise money to repair the roads. The Allied note Apr. 1 said if this were true the matter should be discussed by the interzonal trade negotiators. (West German officials called the new tolls a "cold blockade" designed to cripple West Berlin's economy.)

East & West German trade officials began meetings Apr. 2, but the Reds refused to negotiate Apr. 4 & returned to East Berlin without setting a date for a new meeting. West German officials implied Apr. 2 they might embargo shipments to East Germany unless the tolls were lifted. East German Dep. Premier Otto Nuschke said Apr. 3 that Western economic reprisals would hurt "both Germanies." West Berlin Mayor Otto Suhr said Apr. 6 the toll problem apparently could be settled only on a higher level, presumably the Allied High Commissioners. [See Vol. XIV, p. 106B1]

Other German News

East German Dep. Premier Walter Ulbricht, in a speech reported in the East German press Apr. 5, disclosed plans to rebuild aircraft plants & atomic piles to produce energy for "peaceful uses" in East Germany. [See p. 91D2] . . . Commercial airline flights were resumed Apr. 1 by a West German airline (Lufthansa) for the first time since World War II. First

REFERENCES in brackets give location of background information in this & preceding volumes of FACTS ON FILE with Cumulative Index.

domestic flights were made by 44-passenger Convair 430's made in the U.S. [See Vol. XIV, p. 105G3] . . . The *Stuttgarter Zeitung* said Apr. 2 that assignment to Germany of Brig Gen. Christian de Castries, who led French forces at Dienbienphu (Indo-China), had caused alarm & indignation in West Germany. The paper said de Castries reportedly ordered the destruction & pillaging of Freudenstadt in World War II. [See Vol. XIV, p. 306B1] . . . Soviet Forgn. Min. V. M. Molotov asked the U.S. in a note Apr. 4 for the return of Valery A. Lysikov, 17, who had sought asylum in West Berlin Mar. 22. Molotov said he was being detained by U.S. officials. U.S. High Comm. James B. Conant reiterated Apr. 6 that the U.S. would not force Lysikov to return. [See p. 98C2]

West Warns Austria, Reds

The U.S., Britain & France issued a joint statement Apr. 5 cautioning Austria & the Soviets against bilateral commitments on the Austrian peace treaty. Referring to Austrian Chancellor Julius Raab's planned trip to Moscow Apr. 11, the statement said that if Russia offered "proposals which hold clear promise of the restoration of freedom & independence to Austria, these would appropriately be discussed by the [Big] 4 Ambassadors in Vienna with the participation of the Austrian Govt." [See p. 98A1]

Austrian Communists & extreme rightists were badly beaten in local elections in Styria & Vorarlberg provinces Apr. 3. The Govt. coalition parties (Socialists & Chancellor Julius Raab's People's Party) won overwhelming majorities. [See Vol. XIII, p. 58K]

OEEC Reports Trade Gains

The 6th annual review issued by the 17-nation Org. for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) reported Apr. 6: (1) intra-European trade in 1954 was 128% greater than in 1948 (when the Marshall Plan began), 69% over 1938; (2) exports outside Europe last year were 83% over 1948, exports to the dollar area 130% over 1948, dollar imports 7% less; (3) consumption-per-capita was 12% over 1948; (4) industrial output was 50% over 1938, farm output 30% higher. [See p. 92C1]

(René Sergent of France succeeded Robert Marjolin of France as OEEC secy.-gen. Apr. 1) [See Vol. XIV, p. 382E1]

Other Economic Developments

Premier Edgar Faure said Apr. 4 France had a surplus of $26,200,000 in the European Payments Union (EPU) Mar. 31. [See Vol. XIV, p. 216A2] . . . British Treasury officials reported Apr. 4 that Britain's gold & dollar reserves fell by $14 million in March to a level of $2.667 billion. [See Vol. XIV, p. 216A2] . . . The U. S. Council of the Intl. Chamber of Commerce said Apr. 3 that the General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade (GATT) was a commercial "counterpart of our military alliances." The Council suggested that GATT had helped raise world trade volume by 25% in each of the past 3 years. The Council's report was prepared as a result of the Eisenhower Admin.'s decision to submit GATT organizational provisions to Congress for the first time. [See p. 78D2]

FAR EAST

Democrats Oppose China War

Sen. Wayne Morse (D., Ore.) introduced a resolution in the Senate Apr. 1 to forbid the President's using U.S. armed forces to hold Quemoy & Matsu Islands for the Chinese Nationalists while reaffirming Congressional support for action to defend Formosa [see pp. 25B1, 98E2]. Democratic Sens. Herbert H. Lehman (N.Y.), Hubert H. Humphrey (Minn.) & Russell B. Long (La.) co-sponsored the Morse resolution. The measure was denounced by Minority Leader William F. Knowland (R., Calif.) Apr. 1 as tending to "give aid & comfort to communism" and by Chrmn. Walter F. George (D., Ga.) of the Senate Forgn. Relations Com. Apr. 2 as "not at all conducive to peace." Both Senators predicted the resolution's defeat.

Morse told the Senate Apr. 1 that the U.S. had "not a single legal right" to intervene in Quemoy & Matsu. "The question is whether we are going deliberately to proceed on a course that involves us in war on mainland China as an aggressor nation." [See p. 73E-F3]

Nixon, Dulles on China

Without mentioning Quemoy & Matsu, U.S. Vice Pres. Richard M. Nixon said Apr. 3 a study of history "casts grave doubt" on the contention that war could be avoided by announcing that the U.S. would not defend certain named areas if they were attacked. Speaking before the Amer. Assn. of School Admins. in Cleveland, Nixon said "there is no war party in America" and the Administration would make no "trigger-happy" decisions. He said the idea of a "war party" in the U.S. was an old Communist "big lie" and that the guiding principle of the Admin. was peace without surrender. Nixon said there would be no major war unless the Communists began it. [See p. 90C2]

Gov. W. Averell Harriman (D., N.Y.) criticized the Admin.'s Formosa policy Nov. 3 as disregarding "the sensibilities of either our Asian or our European friends & allies." Speaking at the annual dinner of the Joint Defense Appeal (of the Amer. Jewish Com. & Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith), Harriman said the Admin.'s policy was illogical & "deadly dangerous," but it still was possible to "internationalize the defense of Formosa, so vital in our own & free world security." [See p. 43G1] world security." [See p. 43G1]

State Secy. John Foster Dulles told his news conference Apr. 5 that the U.S. was in close touch with other nations in a continuing effort to ease the "highly dangerous" Formosa situation. But he reported no recent progress. Dulles emphasized that the U.S. was not committed to the defense of Quemoy & Matsu "unless that was vital for the defense of Formosa & the Pescadores." He said the U.S. had no further obligation in the area "expressed or implied." [See p. 98D3]

Stevens in Formosa, Doubts War

After a 2-day visit to Formosa, U.S. Army Secy. Robert T. Stevens said in Taipei Apr. 5 that a Far Eastern war was not imminent. "There is perhaps a larger element of concern back there (the U.S.) about the possibility of war," he observed. Stevens said he did not think U.S. ground troops would be needed in the Formosa area. [See pp. 101A1, 37B2; Vol. XIII, 253D3]

Nehru Backs Reds on Islands

Prime Min. Jawaharlal Nehru told the Indian Parliament in New Delhi Mar. 31 that Quemoy & Matsu belonged to Communist China & that, barring another world war, the islands inevitably would go to Red China. Nehru protested "madhouse" Western diplomacy in almost every part of the world & said he hoped that India would not behave "like the other lunatics." "We have absolutely no intention to throw ourselves into war, even if the whole world is at war," he declared. [See p. 49E2]

Carney Denies War Prediction

Adm. Robert B. Carney, U. S. Chief of Naval Operations, denied Apr. 5 he had predicted a Red Chinese attack in the Formosa Strait around Apr. 15 [see p. 98E2]. Appearing before the Senate Appropriations subcommittee hearing on defense funds, Carney said: "I did not have the temerity to predict what the intentions of any potential enemy might be." He said his remarks to newsmen Mar. 24 dealt only with U. S. & Red Chinese capabilities.

Robert L. Riggs of the *Louisville* (Ky.) *Courier-Journal*, one of the newsmen at the Mar. 24 briefing, released his shorthand conference notes Apr. 6 quoting Carney as saying: "They (the Reds) probably will initiate an attack on Matsu in mid-April. The significance of the timing is that it would tie in with the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung. . . . The all-out attack on Quemoy would be some weeks later . . ." Carney declined to comment on Riggs' notes.

Reds Charge U.S. Air Sorties

The Communist Hsinhua (New China) News Agency reported Apr. 2 that U.S. planes made 18 sorties over Red China's "territorial air" Apr. 1. It said these "military provocations" were carried out by formations of 2 to 8 planes over points on the Shantung Peninsula in North China & Kwangtung Province & Hainan Island in South China. No aerial clashes were reported, but Red planes took to the air in Shantung, the agency said. [See p. 74E-F1]

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U.S. Lets Chinese Students Leave

The U. S. State Dept. announced Apr. 2 that 76 Chinese students with technical training who were denied U. S. exit permits after the start of the Korean war were now "free to depart." They had been denied permits because they might have helped the Reds in Korea. The State Dept. emphasized there was no deal with Peiping to release 15 U. S. airmen & 41 U. S. civilians held by the Chinese Communists. "Our position is that we would like Americans of all categories in China to be released for whatever reason appeals to the Red Chinese authorities," the State Dept. said. [See p. 66B3]

Dulles Delays Japanese Talks

The Japanese Govt. announced Apr. 2 that it wanted to send Forgn. Min. Mamoru Shigemitsu to Washington the following week to explain Japanese points of view on various issues, including reduction of Japan's financial contribution to the maintenance of U.S. forces in Japan. But U.S. State Secy. John Foster Dulles replied Apr. 3 that his schedule did not leave him "adequate time to prepare for" talks with Shigemitsu that soon. He suggested that "the continuing interchange" of U.S. & Japanese diplomats on "the situation in the Far East" could be "supplemented by a visit at a later time."

(U.S. & Japanese representatives in Tokyo had been unable to agree in preliminary discussions on the extent of proposed simultaneous increases in American & Japanese spending on Japan's defense. The Japanese Govt. opposed a large increase in its contribution [see p. 74D2]. American diplomats said the Japanese had tried to rush a Shigemitsu-Dulles conference without the usual amount of preparation. Kyodo news agency said Apr. 4 that Dulles' refusal of an early meeting caused "shock" in Japan & reflected the U.S.' "critical attitude" toward Japan's interest in resuming diplomatic relations with the USSR & expanding its trade with Red China. Dulles told his news conference Apr. 5 he might be able to see Shigemitsu after May 30.) [See pp. 99D1, 93G3-94A1]

Russia Balks on Japanese Parley

Japan disclosed Apr. 6 that the USSR, in a note Apr. 4, had reversed an earlier agreement & refused to confer with Japanese representatives at UN Hq. in New York on a Russo-Japanese peace treaty. Moscow suggested preliminary talks in Tokyo. [See pp. 99D1, 50F3]

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Cao Dai religious sect's armed forces joined the Natl. Army of South Viet Nam Mar. 31, but the sect's pope, Pham Cong Tac, said he wanted to remain in opposition to the Govt. of Premier Ngo Dinh Diem. The Govt. maintained truces with armed forces of the Hoa Hao religious sect & the Binh Xuyen forces following the Mar. 29 fighting. The 3 dissident groups cabled Chief of State Bao Dai (on the French Riviera) Apr. 6 demanding that Diem give up control of Saigon's 4,000-man police force & withdraw troop reinforcements from the capital. This was in reply to Bao Dai's request Apr. 5 that both sides observe a 15-day cooling-off period. [See p. 99B1]

OTHER WORLD NEWS

Israel charged before the UN Security Council in New York Apr. 6 that Egypt had started a series of border incidents that threatened the 6-yr. Palestine truce. Egypt called the complaint "propaganda." Israeli authorities charged that Egyptian forces had loosed a 2-hr. mortar barrage on the Israeli Negev settlement of Nahal Oz Apr. 3, killing 2 Israeli soldiers & wounding 16. A Cairo dispatch Apr. 3 said Israeli armored cars had attacked Egyptian posts 4 mi. north of Gaza. (British Forgn. Secy. Anthony Eden told the House of Commons Apr. 4 that Britain would help guarantee any Arab-Israeli settlement that might be worked out.) [See p. 99B2] . . . **Pakistan's** Forgn. Ministry said Apr. 5 that Turkey & Iraq had asked Pakistan to join the Turkish-Iraqi defense pact signed by Britain in Baghdad Apr. 4 [see p. 99D2]. (Negotiations on the Egyptian-sponsored all-Arab pact were suspended in Cairo Apr. 3 when the Syrian delegation returned home for consultations [see p. 74E3]. India & Egypt signed a friendship & trade treaty in Cairo Apr. 6.) [See p. 50G2] . . . **South Africa** announced Apr. 5 it had decided to quit the UN Educational, Scientific & Cultural Org. (UNESCO) because of the agency's "interference in South Africa's racial problems." South Africa also announced it would not take part in May hearings before the Intl. Court of Justice on South African administration of South-West Africa, a League of Nations mandate territory incorporated by South Africa in 1949 [see Vol. XIV, p. 415C1]. (Indian Prime Min. Jawaharlal Nehru said in New Delhi Apr. 3 that the UN should take "a strong, steady stand" on South Africa's racial policies.) [See p. 46G3]

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Presidential News

Pres. Eisenhower asked Congress Apr. 1 for a fiscal 1956 appropriation of $74,980,000 to compete the Inter-American Highway to Panama in 3 years. Central American countries would contribute an additional $37,490,000 under the 2-1 matching basis for financing the road. He said the highway would aid security, economic development and political & cultural relations among Latin American nations & the U.S. [See p. 77C-D3]

The $745 million-a-yr. military pay increase bill (HR4720) was signed by the President Mar. 31. [See p. 100B1] . . . A bill authorizing permanent U.S. residence for Jan R. Cwiklinski, ex-captain of the Polish motorship *Batory* who jumped ship & applied for political asylum, was signed by the President Mar. 31. [See p. 31E3; Vol. XIII, p. 203G] . . . Pres. Eisenhower asked Congress Mar. 31 to cut his original $1,120,900,000 atomic energy budget for fiscal 1956 to $1.045 billion. White House & Atomic Energy Comm. spokesmen said the cut was made possible by savings in costs and that no decrease in atomic programs was planned. [See p. 19F3]

Pres. & Mrs. Eisenhower have shifted voting residence from New York to Adams County, Pa., site of their Gettysburg farm, White House press secy. James C. Hagerty announced Apr. 4. [See Vol. XIV, p. 416B2] . . . Sen. Richard L. Neuberger (D., Ore.) Mar. 31 gave the Wildlife Management Inst. $202.48 collected in his "save the White House squirrels" campaign. [See p. 99B3]

Personnel

Pres. Eisenhower Apr. 2 accepted the resignation (effective June 30) of Saml. W. Anderson, 57, Asst. Commerce Secy. for Intl. Affairs. [See Vol. XIII, pp. 207N, 186H, 28D] . . . Julius C. Holmes' nomination as Amb. to Iran was withdrawn at Holmes' request Apr. 1. Holmes' physician had advised him not to take the post. (The Senate Forgn. Relations Com. had approved Holmes' nomination after he testified Feb. 17 that he had made a $270,000 profit on a $10,000 investment in a surplus tanker deal in 1947 but that there was nothing legally or ethically wrong with the transaction.) [See p. 44A-B2] . . . Appointed by the President Apr. 6: John H. Clawson, Anchorage, Alaska banker & builder, as U.S. member of the Intl. North Pacific Fisheries Comm.; Vice Adm. Thos. S. Combs to succeed Vice Adm. Ralph A. Ofstie as member of the Natl. Advisory Com. for Aeronautics.

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CONGRESS

Stassen Rejects Subpena

Forgn. Operations Dir. Harold E. Stassen refused Apr. 1 to accept a Senate Investigations Subcom. subpena in an inquiry into a controversial FOA contract for grain elevators in Pakistan. He said he had agreed voluntarily to appear & produce documents subpenaed by the subcommittee, and he met with it Apr. 4 & 6. But he refused Apr. 6 to give the Senators 10 documents, which he described as confidential Executive Branch correspondence, until he reviewed them to see whether they should be made public.

The subpena was voted unanimously by the subcommittee Mar. 31 because of Stassen's orders that none of his aides were to be interviewed by the subcommittee staff except when he or FOA lawyers were present. (This order did not apply to questioning by actual committee members.) FOA deputy general counsel Willard J. Saccio, acting on Stassen's instructions, refused Mar. 31 to let the sub-

committee staff question Howard P. Morrison of the FOA without allowing Saccio to be present.

Stassen's order was denounced as arrogant & obstructive by subcommittee members. Subcom. Chrmn. John L. McClellan (D., Ark.) termed it a "revolting development." Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy (R., Wis.) called it "the most un-heard of thing I have seen." Sen. Sam J. Ervin (D., N.C.), paraphrasing Shakespeare, asked, "What meat doth this Caesar eat that he has grown so great?"

FOA Aides Submit to Quiz

The subcommittee voted unanimously Mar. 31 to order Stassen's aides to appear without FOA lawyers, but it agreed they could bring non-FOA counsel. Stassen said in a statement that he thought it not "fair or reasonable or wise" to let subcommittee staff members "summon individual employes of the FOA without any committee member present & without counsel of their own choice."

But next day Stassen withdrew his ban on questioning of his aides by the staff without FOA lawyers present. Morrison & 2 other FOA officials —Virgil Pettit & Wesley S. Middaugh—appeared before subcommittee chief counsel Robert F. Kennedy Apr. 1 without an FOA lawyer but accompanied by FOA consultant Milton Quint, ex-attorney for FOA's predecessor, the Mutual Security Agency. Kennedy did not object to this.

The inquiry originated from a demand by Sen. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) that the FOA explain why it chose the highest of 5 bidders to build 3 grain storage elevators in Pakistan. The high bid, $2,430,980.05, was by the Agricultural Construction Co. of Los Angeles. The Columbian Steel Tank Co. of Kansas City, Mo. made the lowest bid, $1,448,923.

It was reported that Senate minority leader William F. Knowland (Calif.) had forwarded to the FOA, as a "routine matter," a telegram in which the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce urged acceptance of Agricultural Construction's bid. McClellan said Apr. 4 that the Los Angeles firm was set up only 2 weeks before bids were opened. It also was revealed that the 5 firms had not bid competitively on Govt. specifications but had been asked to submit their own designs & costs.

Stassen said during his Apr. 6 appearance before the subcommittee that he would throw out the disputed bids and start over again with a call for new bids. [See p. 36C3]

McCarthy Charges 'Perjury'

McCarthy declared at the Apr. 6 session that Stassen had lied in saying in a *N.Y. Times* interview that when McCarthy ran the subcommittee, FOA aides had not been allowed to see transcripts of their testimony but had been cross-examined weeks later on the basis of "doctored" transcripts. McCarthy said no transcripts were made. He charged that Stassen had "perjured himself" by insisting in testimony that they were made.

McCarthy accused Stassen of "smearing" subcommittee counsel Kennedy & ex-subcommittee lawyer Francis D. Flanagan—"these young lawyers who can't protect themselves" —by his charge of "doctored" transcripts. Stassen said he had not reflected on them but on "abuses" of the committee under McCarthy. McCarthy urged Justice Dept. action on Stassen's "perjury," but McClellan refused to halt the hearing to pursue a side issue although he said McCarthy could bring it up later. [See p. 76E3]

Legislative Hearings

FPC Chrmn. Jerome K. Kuykendall told the House Commerce Com. Mar. 22 that lower rates to consumers would result in the long run if Congress ended FPC control of natural gas producers. He said such action would "contribute to the soundness & the security of the sources of gas supply" & to "maintenance of adequate service." He said federal control of natural gas was "discrimination . . . in favor of other competitive fuels." [See p. 70D1]

Earl M. Hughes, administrator of the Agriculture Dept.'s Commodity Stabilization Svc., urged at a House Agriculture subcommittee hearing Mar. 16 that the program for importing Mexican farm laborers be made permanent without change. But Asst. Labor Secy. Rocco C. Siciliano urged a 4½-yr. extension with such changes as: (a) a requirement that U.S. workers be offered transportation, housing & insurance comparable to those of imported workers; (b) a provision making it clear that U.S. farmers could not pay Mexicans less than U.S. workers. [See p. 21E-F1]

Spokesmen for Army, Navy & Air Force intelligence urged at House Judiciary subcommittee hearings Mar. 29 that the services be permitted to continue to tap phones, at least in security cases. They testified that the Navy had used 5 phone taps & the Army 11 last year whereas the Air Force never had tapped a phone. This contrasted with earlier testimony that the FBI sometimes tapped as many as 200 phones at one time. Bernard Spindel, professional wire-tapper & ex-consultant to the N.Y.C. Anti-Crime Com., testified Mar. 30 that modern tapping devices made it possible to: (a) stand outside the House Office Bldg. & hear phone conversations inside, (b) record conversations from as far away as 400 yds., (c) convert any phone or electrical appliance into a microphone that could pick up all conversation within 30 ft., (d) stand several ft. away from a row of phone booths and, without direct tap wires, record both sides of a conversation on any of the phones. [See p. 80F3]

Senate Inquiries

Chrmn. Harley M. Kilgore (D., W. Va.) of the Senate Judiciary Com. announced Apr. 5 that the Anti-Trust & Monopoly Subcom., of which he was chairman, would make a "full-scale investigation" of monopoly & anti-trust policies. Ex-Justice Dept. attorney Joseph W. Burns was to be the inquiry's general counsel. [See Vol. XIV, p. 340F1, E2] . . . The Senate Armed Services Com. Mar. 29 created a "watch-dog" subcommittee headed by Senate majority leader Lyndon B. Johnson (Tex.) to check on defense activities. (The Senate had voted $160,000 for the subcommittee for April through Jan. 1956.) . . . Asst. Atty. Gen. Warren Olney 3d assured the Senate in a letter read on the floor Mar. 18 that Senate Elections Subcom. staff members violated no federal law when they put a "mail cover" on Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy (R., Wis.) during an investigation of the Senator. [See Vol. XIV, p. 418E1] . . . The FCC asked the Senate Commerce Com. Mar. 19 for authority to conduct "an over-all study of the [radio & TV] broadcast industry—including a review of the network rules." The FCC said only 5 million of the nation's 35 million TV sets could receive ultra-high-frequency as well as very-high-frequency signals and that only 20% of new sets being made could receive both. [See p. 68E1]

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New admission cards for the House public gallery warn visitors not to smoke, applaud, read, take notes or hang things over the railings. The first batch of cards was presented Mar. 28 to Rep. Gracie Pfost (D., Ida.), who had suggested the idea.

Easter recess was begun by both houses of Congress Apr. 4. It was to continue until Apr. 13.

LABOR

UAW Votes Annual Wage Fund

A $25 million strike fund was authorized at the CIO United Auto Workers convention in Cleveland Mar. 29 to back UAW Pres. Walter P. Reuther's drive for the guaranteed annual wage (GAW). Delegates to the convention, held Mar. 27-Apr. 1, agreed to increase the $2.50 monthly dues of the UAW's 1½ million members by $5 in order to raise the strike fund. The UAW national strike fund already totaled $7,433,819. The dues were to revert to $2.50 when the fund reached $25 million, be increased to $3.50 whenever it dropped below $20 million. (The 1,200 UAW locals had an additional $5 million in their individual strike funds.)

AFL Pres. George Meany, making the first appearance of an AFL president at a CIO union's national convention, virtually promised Mar. 29 to give the UAW financial & other aid in its fight for GAW. (Reuther Mar. 31 made public a letter to the Natl. Assn. of Mfrs. in which he denounced an alleged NAM effort to raise a $30 million "propaganda fund" to fight GAW. NAM Pres. Henry G. Riter 3d denied Apr. 1 that the NAM planned such a fund. He said the 1955 NAM budget totaled $5 million.)

The convention Mar. 30 authorized a $1½ million contribution to a nationwide organizing drive by a unified AFL & CIO. The convention agreed Apr. 1 that a shorter work week would be the next goal after GAW. Reuther & UAW Secy.-Treasurer Emil

Mazey were reelected for 6th terms Mar. 30. [See pp. 99E1, 53B1, 36E2; Vol. XIV, 418B2, 409B3, 401F2]

Kansas Union Curb Vetoed

Republican Gov. Fred Hall Mar. 28 vetoed as "punitive legislation" a "right-to-work" bill which would have made Kansas the 19th state to prohibit union shop contracts. Labor Secy. James P. Mitchell lauded Hall's "commendable courage," called his action "a service" to workers & employers. (A similar bill was rejected by both houses of the Maryland legislature.) [See p. 45G2]

Legal Decisions

The Supreme Court ruled in a 5-3 decision Apr. 4 that federal courts below the Supreme Court could not intervene in anti-picketing injunctions granted by state courts in cases where state appeals procedure had not been used. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas & Black dissented. The case involved an attempt by the CIO Amalgamated Clothing Workers to get a federal court to order Richman Bros. Co. to withdraw a state court action. The Ohio Common Pleas Court had granted Richman Bros. a temporary injunction prohibiting peaceful picketing at 69 stores in 16 states.

Fed. Dist. Judge Alexander Holtzoff ruled in Washington Apr. 4 that the Govt. could not set nationwide wage minimums in industries employed on Govt. contracts. He granted 140 Southern textile mills a permanent injunction against a Labor Dept. order raising the 87¢-an-hr. wage to $1—the national "prevailing" rate. The ruling was on an interpretation of the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Law which required Govt. contractors to pay at least the "prevailing" rate for their industry in their "locality." The decision was a blow to textile unions & to northern textile mills, which had complained that sub-standard southern wages put them at a competitive disadvantage. [See p. 36F2; Vol. XIV, 432F3]

The U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington Feb. 24 stayed a Feb. 1 NLRB order withdrawing collective bargaining rights of the Intl. Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers for alleged non-compliance with the Taft-Hartley law's non-Communist oath provisions [see p. 84F1]. The NLRB Feb. 28 withdrew rights of the Natl. Marine Cooks & Stewards for alleged non-compliance with the Taft-Hartley requirement of financial reports to members. [See Vol. XIII, p. 341D2]

ARMED FORCES

Atomic AA Missile Tested

An atomic guided missile designed for use against aircraft was launched from a B-36 at a height of about 40,000 ft. shortly before 10 a.m. Apr. 6. It exploded about 6 miles above the Yucca Flat, Nev. atomic proving grounds—highest altitude of any known nuclear test blast.

The device flew under its own power (presumably guided electronically from the plane) into a pattern of smoke trails which 6 F-86 Sabrejets had laid down for blast measurement. The warhead, with explosive force equal to about 5,000-10,000 tons of TNT, was believed capable of destroying a fleet of bombers without even hitting any.

The blast was followed by a tremendous smoke ring instead of the usual mushroom-shaped cloud. The AEC said there was "a light [radioactive] fall-out." [See p. 102C1]

Eye Injuries Confirmed

The Defense Dept. confirmed Apr. 1 that 4 servicemen had incurred eye injuries — 2 possibly permanent — through failure to cover their eyes properly during atomic tests in Nevada in 1952 & 1953. The announcement was made nearly 2 weeks after the *Harrisburg* (Pa.) *Sunday Patriot-News*, the *Newark* (N.J.) *Star Ledger* & other papers reported up to 6 such injuries allegedly hushed up by the Defense Dept. The Defense Dept., AEC & Civil Defense Admin. had claimed in a handbook distributed at the current tests that "no participant or observer has ever been injured by test activity at Nevada test site."

AEC Chrmn. Lewis L. Strauss said on a TV program Apr. 3 that the injuries "never have been reported to the AEC" and that he knew only what he had read in the papers. (The UP cited informed sources as saying the Defense Dept. had informed neither the AEC nor the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Com.)

(Japanese Forgn. Min. Mamoru Shigemitsu told the Japanese Diet Mar. 30 that Japan had asked the U.S. formally in Oct. 1954 & in Jan. 1955 either to stop nuclear weapons tests at Bikini or to test bombs smaller than the one whose fall-out caused injuries to Japanese fishermen in Mar. 1954. [See p. 102C1]

(Vice Pres. Nixon said in Chicago Mar. 17 that U.S. forces in the Pacific were equipped with tactical atomic weapons and would use them against military targets if war were started.) [See p. 82F2]

Chiefs Differ on Manpower

Adm. Arthur W. Radford, Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, testified before a Senate Appropriations Subcom. Apr. 4 that a reduction in the armed forces' manpower was possible because "atomic weapons" are now "conventional." He said the Admin.'s reduced goal of 2,850,000 men under arms was a program the country could support for "an indefinite period . . . as long as the Communist threat hangs over our head." Defense Secy. Charles E. Wilson also testified Apr. 4 that the "sound, long-range" program assured the country of a "retaliatory" force with "tremendous" power to "perform essential tasks in the initial phases of a general war." [See pp. 46A-B2, 37F2]

Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Marine Corps Commandant, told the subcommittee Apr. 5 that the USMC's cutback to 193,000 men from 215,000 required a "sacrifice" of some "reinforcing combat & logistic units" and a reduced "manning of other supporting units" but no less "readiness of our basic striking forces." Adm. Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, indorsed Apr. 5 the Navy's personnel cut to 657,000 men from 665,000 but warned of Russia's "vast naval building program" and said it indicated the Soviets "are not contemplating a short war." Navy Secy. Charles S. Thomas said the Admin.'s program provided for a Navy able to "withstand any initial onslaught" & expand quickly for all-out war. AF Secy. Harold E. Talbott said his service had been given a "good budget." [See p. 37A3]

Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff, testified Apr. 6 that he had recommended a 1,300,000-man instead of 1,027,000-man Army (present strength: 1,270,000 men) & the Joint Chiefs had not recommended reductions in military manpower but would carry out "wholeheartedly" the decision of "duly constituted civilian authorities" to reduce manpower. [See p. 37E-F2]

Gen. Nathan F. Twining, AF Chief of Staff, said Apr. 6 that the AF's development of intercontinental missiles had "very high priority" because of known Soviet progress in designing such weapons; development of new military air bases in China would enable the Russians & Red Chinese to double or triple their Far Eastern air forces "overnight" by rushing in Soviet planes. [See p. 50A1]

POLITICS

Daley Elected Chicago Mayor

Richard J. Daley, 52, a Democrat, was elected Mayor of Chicago Apr. 5 by a 708,660-581,461 vote over Republican reform candidate Robert E. Merriam. Democrats swept city-wide offices and kept control of the 50-man City Council. [See p. 61C-D3]

Republicans

Vice Pres. Nixon warned in speeches in Los Angeles Mar. 14 & Chicago Mar. 17 that "the Republican Party is not strong enough today to elect a President" and needed "a Presidential candidate strong enough to get the Republican Party elected." He said Pres. Eisenhower was "taking hold of the Republican Party leadership" in hopes of building "the party up so that the party can elect the candidate." Nixon said "the Democratic Party is numerically stronger than the Republican Party" but "has no candidate . . . as strong as his party." [See p. 82D3] . . . The conservative Abraham Lincoln Natl. Republican Club of Chicago announced Mar. 27 a "nationwide drive to wrest control of the Republican Party from New Dealers & internationalists." It called this "the first major break in Republican ranks between Eisenhower 'liberals' & the so-called conservative, 'isolationist' wing." [See p. 52F1] . . . L. Richard Guylay, 42, N.Y. public relations man, was chosen Apr. 3 to replace *Los Angeles Daily Mirror* city editor James Bassett as public relations director of the GOP Natl. Com. [See Vol. XIV, p. 222C3]

FOREIGN

Churchill Retires, Eden In

Sir Winston Churchill, 80 last Nov. 30, retired Apr. 5 as British Prime Minister. Forgn. Secy. Sir Anthony Eden, to be 58 June 12, was appointed new Prime Minister by Queen Elizabeth II Apr. 6.

Churchill disclosed in a letter (made public Apr. 6) to John Harvey, Conservative Party chairman in his Woodford constituency, that he had decided to retire from the Prime Ministry due to "my age" & the fact that "indefinite responsibilities" would fall on the Prime Minister in the next election campaign. Churchill said his successor should have "reasonable time to present himself & his program to the nation."

Churchill's retirement from the Cabinet was preceded by a dinner at 10 Downing St. (Prime Min.'s London residence) Apr. 4 attended by the Queen, who proposed a toast to Churchill—both acts rare tributes by a British monarch to a Prime Minister & commoner.

Sir Winston Churchill (left), pictured as he called on Queen to submit resignation, & Sir Anthony Eden, Churchill's successor as Prime Min.

(Reports differed on whether the Queen, aware that Churchill wanted to remain in Commons, actually offered him a dukedom when he formally called on her Apr. 5 to resign & recommend Eden as his successor. Churchill had served for 8 yrs. 7 mos. 25 days as Prime Minister—May 10, 1940-July 25, 1945 & since Oct. 26, 1951. His retirement from the Cabinet, although generally expected outside the U.K., took most Britons unawares because a strike had silenced most national newspapers. The BBC had not reported Churchill's evident preparations to resign. Among tributes paid Churchill by world leaders: Pres. Eisenhower said Apr. 5 the world must not be "denied your counsel, your advice." Ex-Pres. Truman Apr. 6 called Churchill "a great man of our age.") [See Vol. XI, p. 349H for detailed biog. of Churchill; also indexes to all volumes for references]

Red China Reveals Purge

Kao Kang, past 50, Manchurian Red leader & an original Vice Chairman of the Red Chinese Govt., & Jao Shushih, 53, ex-Communist Party organizational chief & ex-CP Secy. for East China, were expelled from the party at a national CP conference Mar. 21-31, it was announced Apr. 4 in a series of communiqués issued by the Chinese Communist Central Committee.

Kao was said to have "committed suicide as an expression of his ultimate betrayal of the party." He was expelled from the party after his death, which was said to have followed a party "warning" to him in Feb. 1954, when CP Secy. Gen. Liu Shao-chi said that some "high-ranking cadres" had set up "independent kingdoms" & become too "arrogant."

The Apr. 4 communiqués accused Kao of "conspiratorial activities" aimed at overthrowing the Politburo & seizing "leadership of the party & the state." Jao, it was said, was still alive but had refused to repent & "now persists in an attitude of attacking the party."

The March CP conference also took disciplinary action against 7 supporters of the Kao-Jao "anti-party alliance": Hsiang Ming, Chang Hsiu-shan, Chang Ming-yuan, Chao Teh-tsun, Ma Hung, Kuo Feng & Chen Po-tsun.

(The Apr. 4 communiqués were the first in Red China to disclose a purge in the CP's higher ranks. Both Kao & Jao long had been regarded as among leaders of the Chinese CP's pro-Russian wing. Kao was ranked 9th, Jao 11th when the post-World War II CP Central Com. was elected in 1945, but neither had been mentioned in the news in China the past year. Kao, ex-State Planning Comm. chairman, had been called the "Stalin of Manchuria" because of his drive to copy Soviet industrial methods & build up a system of collective farms. Jao was CP leader in the Shanghai area.)

The CP's recent (March) conference was called to consider a Red Chinese 5-yr. plan begun in 1953 under Kao's direction. The Peiping *People's Daily* conceded Apr. 5 there had been failures during the plan's first 2 years. The paper said: "It probably requires 3 5-year plans to build a socialist society, but to build a powerful, highly industrialized socialist country requires decades of arduous effort, possibly 50 years." It said "the emphasis has to be laid on heavy industry" because of the threat of "imperialist aggression."

The March CP conference, attended by Pres. Mao Tse-tung, was reported to have: (1) approved a new draft of the 5-year plan; (2) set up a new Central Control Com. & a network of local control committees to strengthen ideological work & combat "subversive activities"; (3) elected Gen. Lin Piao & Dep. Premier Teng Hsiao-ping to the Politburo. Other Politburo members were listed as follows: Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Chen Yun, Kang Sheng, Peng Chen, Tung Pi-wu, Lin Chochu, Chang Wen-tien & Gen. Peng Teh-huai. [See pp. 2G2, 58E1; Vol. XIV, 130B1]

BUSINESS & FINANCIAL SUMMARY

Week Ended Apr. 2

	This Week	Last Week	Year Ago
FINANCE:			
U.S. Treasury—			
Monetary gold stocks	*$21,719	*$21,718	*$21,965
Currency circulation	*$29,738	*$29,719	*$29,707
Fed. Reserve System—	Mar. 30	Mar. 23	Mar. 31, 1954
Reserves	*$5,787.843	*$5,580.278	*$5,867.83
U.S. Securities	*$6,029.372	*$6,029.372	*$6,341.053
Note circulation	*$5,746.319	*$5,740.475	*$5,688.128
Reserve ratio	48.7%	47.5%	48.1%
Banks	This Week	Last Week	Year Ago
Com'l, ind'l & agri'l loans§	*[a]$22,747	*$22,694	*$22,821
N.Y. bank clearings	$9,658,457,617	$10,370,538,111	$10,195,927,282
England note circulation	*£1,696.26	*£1,683.28	*£1,576.905
N.Y. Stock Exchange—			
Stock sales (shares)	14,082,438	12,377,490	10,785,430
Stock avgs. (100 stocks)**	185.17	185.39	154.76
Bond sales (par value)	$14,936,000	$14,622,000	$15,689,300
Bond avgs. (30 bonds)**	100.43	100.24	101.45
INDUSTRY:			
Auto output (cars & trucks)†	206,606	205,459	138,591
Crude oil (bbls. daily)	[b]6,862,600	6,858,400	6,452,150
Soft-coal output (tons)	[c]8,050,000	8,310,000	6,750,000
Electric output (kwh.)	*[b]9,907	*9,814	*8,491
Carloadings (cars)	[b]639,447	656,117	601,414
	Feb.	Jan.	Feb. 1954
Steel output (tons)	8,496,934	8,837,736	7,083,237
PRICES:	This Week	Last Week	Year Ago
Wheat (bu.)	$2.75½	$2.78⅞	$2.76½
Corn (bu.)	$1.72⅜	$1.73⅝	$1.81½
Cotton (lb.)	$.3435	$.3435	$.352
Steel scrap avg. (ton)	$37.00	$37.50	$24.33
Wholesale food index‡	[d]$6.52	$6.55	$7.42
Weekly whlsl. index (BLS)¶	[d]110.5	110.1	110.9
BUSINESS:			
Dept. store sales§¶	[b]102	108	100
Failures (Mar. 24)‡	232	226	277
	Feb.	Jan.	Feb. 1954
New incorps.‡	11,369	13,181	8,533

*In millions **N.Y. Herald Tribune †Ward's estimate ‡Dun & Bradstreet ¶1947-49=100 §Fed. Reserve Board [a]Member banks, 94 cities, Mar. 23 [b]Mar. 26 [c]Mar. 19 [d]Mar. 29

U.S. TREASURY STATEMENT

(Released Apr. 5)	March	Mar. 1954	July '54-Mar. '55	July '53-Mar.-'54
Net deposits	$10,942,763,315	$12,259,826,013	$47,527,023,843	$52,618,782,503
Indiv. income taxes:				
Withheld	$2,107,580,937	$1,663,541,202	$15,917,063,142	$16,888,331,700
Other	$725,547,632	$2,412,330,556	$6,162,770,665	$8,451,688,199
Corp. income taxes	$6,843,884,146	$7,356,278,708	$11,260,393,081	$13,587,392,885
Excise taxes	$863,526,019	$672,754,354	$6,690,253,262	$7,359,576,203
Net withdrawals	$6,932,353,825	$6,236,982,750	$51,589,012,000	$53,548,737,725
Military	$3,308,983,566	$3,510,767,110	$26,785,539,030	$31,088,394,635
Forgn. aid programs	$336,342,324	$437,976,531	$2,863,958,471	$3,626,409,253
Veterans	$379,563,846	$358,973,135	$3,007,828,539	$3,107,364,279
Int. on pub. debt	$469,507,267	$571,923,921	$3,443,987,921	$3,454,566,226
Increase in pub. debt	.....	.....	$2,788,219,054	$4,164,306,830
Decrease in pub. debt	$4,134,136,479	$4,546,170,670	.....	.....

Gross pub. debt & guaranteed obligations $274,080,432,998 (including $273,571,209,594 subject to statutory limitation); last year $270,312,455,205.
Gold reserve $21,719,042,324; year ago $21,965,245,722.
Treasury balance $5,150,785,410.98; year ago $6,354,530,464.87.

ARTS & SCIENCE

King Herod's palace was unearthed in Masada near the Dead Sea in Israel during a 12-day expedition ended Mar. 31, an Israeli Govt. archeological party reported. Ruins of palace indicated it was exactly as described by historian Flavius Josephus. (Herod ruled in Judea from 37 to 4 B.C.) [See p. 47E2] . . . **Italian** police arrested 10 persons in Rome Apr. 3 & charged them with looting Etruscan tombs to supply a black market in antiquities. . . . **Radio** waves from planet Jupiter have been received by a Carnegie Inst. antenna, Drs. Bernard F. Burke & Kenneth L. Franklin reported Apr. 5 to an Amer. Astronomical Soc. meeting in Princeton, N.J. Atmospheric disturbances similar to thunderstorms on Earth were believed to have caused the waves. . . . **Israel's** Health Ministry revealed Apr. 3 that 600 liters of Salk anti-polio vaccine had been donated to Israel by the U.S. Natl. Foundation for Infantile Paralysys. [See p. 103G1] . . . **Cancer** of the stomach was found after a 7-yr. study to be 81% curable if detected before the start of symptoms, 57% curable if treatment began afterwards, Dr. Claude R. Hitchcock, U. of Minn. cancer center director, reported Apr. 5 to a Natl. Cancer Inst. meeting in New York. He said the study revealed that persons with little or no free acid in the stomach contracted cancer 7 times more frequently than the normal rate. [See Vol. XIV, p. 21B3]

Herbert von Karajan was officially named conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra Apr. 5 to succeed the late Wilhelm Furtwaengler. [See Vol. XIV, p. 71A1] . . . **Rabbi Joachim Prinz** of Newark, N.J., ex-leader of Berlin's Jewish community, was awarded a $30,000 libel judgment by a Superior Court jury in Newark Mar. 31 against Conde McGinley, ed. of *Common Sense*, who had called Prinz a "Red Rabbi."

Awards: Amer. Watercolor Society's "watercolor of the year" $1,000 award to Chinese-born artist Chen Chi of New York Apr. 5. . . . Amer. Chemical Society's Priestley medal for 1955 to Dr. Charles Allen Thomas, Monsanto Chemical Co. pres., Apr. 2. [See Vol. XIII, p. 304E2] . . . Natl. Inst. of Arts & Science gold medal for painting to Edward Hopper, 73, Apr. 3. [See Vol. XIV, p. 79G1] . . . Governor General's award for best Canadian novel of 1954, *Fall of a Titan*, to Igor Gouzenko, ex-Soviet aide, Apr. 2. [See Vol. XIV, p. 247F1]

EDUCATION

Council for Financial Aid to Education's nationwide survey revealed Apr. 2 that half of the colleges in the U.S. operated at a deficit. The study showed that education costs had risen 50% per capita since 1948 while tuition fees had risen only 21%. The Council estimated that $5.5 billion would be needed to support schools for the next 10 years. (Financier Beardsley Ruml told the Amer. Assn. of School Administrators, meeting in Cleveland Apr. 4, that he would urge Congress to pass a bill providing a graduated scale of federal aid to schools ($20 a child in 1956, $80 a child by 1965. Estimated cost by the end of 1965: $3.5 billion a year.) [See p. 100E1] . . . **Oklahoma** voters approved by referendum Apr. 5 a constitutional amendment to refinance public schools as a step toward desegregation. [See Vol. XIV, p. 386B1] . . . **Mississippi** Gov. Hugh White signed a bill Apr. 5 providing fines & jail sentences for white pupils attending schools with Negroes. [See Vol. XIV, p. 427D3] . . . **North Carolina** House of Reps. unanimously passed Apr. 4 & sent to the Senate a resolution which stated "mixing of the races in public schools . . . cannot be accomplished." [See p. 103E2] . . . **Dr. Lin Yutang** resigned Apr. 4 as Chancellor of Nanyang U. in Singapore, reportedly over administrative disputes over the University's budget. He & 13 other staff members who also resigned received $100,000 in compensation Apr. 6. [See Vol. XIV, p. 31B3]

OBITUARIES

Robert Burns Armstrong Jr., 52, Washington correspondent of *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, husband of *N.Y. Times* Washn. correspondent Bess Furman; Apr. 3 in Washington (heart attack).

Morton Drew Carrel, 79, ex-Govt. official specializing in Latin Amer. economy, acting Puerto Rico Gov. 1912-14; Apr. 4 in Orlando, Fla.

Frederic René Coudert Sr., 84, authority on constitutional & intl. law, father of Rep. Frederic R. Coudert Jr. (R., N.Y.); Apr. 1, N.Y.

Dr. George Hutcheson Denny, 84, pres. Washington & Lee U. 1901-11, U. of Ala. 1912-37; Apr. 2, Lexington, Va.

Thomas James Dunbabin, 43, British archeologist, wartime intelligence agent in German-occupied Crete; Mar. 31 in Oxford, Eng.

Junius Blair Fishburn, 89, bd. Chrmn. Times-World Corp. *Roanoke* (Va.) *Times & World-News;* Apr. 1 in Roanoke.

Charles Moreau Harger, 92, pres.-editor *Abilene Reflector - Chronicle*, founder & first pres. of Eisenhower Foundation in Abilene, a friend who helped get young Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed to West Point; Apr. 3 in Abilene.

Edward Arthur Hayes, 62, Amer. Legion natl. comdr. 1933-34, mgr. Vice Presidential campaign of late Frank Knox in 1936, unsuccessful candidate for GOP nomination for U.S. Senator in Ill. in 1954; Apr. 1 in Chicago.

Karl Hofer, 76, leading exponent of modern painting, head of West Berlin Academy of Art (he was dismissed from all official functions by Nazis); Apr. 3 in Berlin.

Dr. Charles Adams Holder, 83, banker, ex-Forgn. Service officer, ex-husband of Mrs. Dorothy Caruso Ingram (widow of tenor Enrico Caruso); Apr. 3 in Boston.

Theodore Carrington Jessup, 63, headmaster of Ridgefield (Conn.) Boys School in 1922-33, bro. of ex-Amb. Philip C. Jessup; Apr. 5 in Ridgefield.

Wide World

Publishers Joseph Pulitzer (left) & Robert R. McCormick, whose deaths are reported below. Pres. Eisenhower said in a statement Apr. 1 on their passing: "American journalism has lost the services of 2 of its outstanding publishers. Although frequently on opposite sides of public issues, both were staunch champions of a free press so essential to our freedoms."

Adrien Marquet, 70, Interior Min. in first Vichy French Govt. 1940 who received 10-yr. sentence after war for collaboration; Apr. 3 in Bordeaux.

Col. Robert Rutherford McCormick, 74, ed.-pblshr. of *Chicago Tribune* since 1910, chrmn.-vice pres.-treas. of News Syndicate Co. (pblshr. of *N.Y. Daily News*); Apr. 1 at his farm at Wheaton, Ill. following abdominal operation for adhesions Jan. 19.

McCormick (see photo above) was born July 30, 1880 in Chicago, grandson of Tribune pblshr. Jos. Medill & Wm. McCormick, a partner of Cyrus McCormick in developing reaper machine. Son of career diplomat Robt. Sanderson McCormick. Educated in England & at Groton School (Mass.) & Yale, earned law degree at Northwestern. War correspondent, U.S. intelligence officer & artillery colonel in World War I. He & cousin Jos. Medill Patterson, late N.Y. Daily News pblshr., developed Tribune into internationally-known newspaper under slogan "World's Greatest Newspaper," became famous for isolationist, anti-New Deal, anti-Eastern U.S., anti-British, right-wing Republican editorial crusades. Will made public Apr. 5 passed management of Tribune to vice pres. Chesser M. Campbell, treas. J. Howard Wood & mng. ed. William D. Maxwell. [See Index to Vols. I-XV for references to McCormick & Chicago Tribune]

Maj. Gen. Irving Joseph Phillipson, 73, exec. dir. Army Emergency Relief 1942-44; Apr. 4 in Barcelona.

Prof. Sergei N. Prokopovich, 84, exiled observer & analyst of Soviet economy (he fled Czarist Govt., became Trade & Industry Min. & Food Min. after Mar. 1917 Revolution, left USSR soon after the Nov. 1917 Revolution); reported in Geneva Apr. 5.

Joseph Pulitzer, 70, ed.-pblshr. of *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* since 1912; Mar. 30 in St. Louis of ruptured abdominal blood vessel.

Pulitzer (see photo above) was son of Joseph Pulitzer (died 1911), N.Y. World pblshr. who founded Post-Dispatch & Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia U., NYC. Continued Post-Dispatch in father's independent, editorially-aggressive tradition; paper won many journalistic prizes for public service & exposure of corruption. Pulitzer, like his father, became semi-blind, kept up with news by having aides read to him. (Joseph Pulitzer Jr., 41, succeeded his father as ed.-pblshr. Apr. 4.)

Rev. Dr. Thomas Todhunter Shields, 81, Canadian Critic of Roman Catholic Church & modernism whose sermons in the Jarvis St. Baptist Church, Toronto, repeatedly split his congre-

gations & caused national controversy; Apr. 4 in Toronto.

Nikolai Ivanovich Veretennikov, 85, who wrote several books about his cousin Nikolai Lenin, established Lenin museums in USSR; death reported by Soviet press Apr. 5.

SPORTS

Winners

Boxing: Tony De Marco, 23, of Boston, 145 lb., won the world welterweight championship by scoring a 14th-round TKO over Johnny Saxton of New York in Boston Apr. 1 [see Vol. XIV, p. 360E1]. The New York & Chicago teams tied, 4 bouts to 4, in the Golden Gloves amateur finals in Chicago Mar. 31 [see Vol. XIV, p. 96D1]. Michigan State won the team title, Crowe Peels of LSU the heavyweight title in the NCAA tourney in Pocatello, Ida. Apr. 2. . . . **Golf:** Billy Maxwell, 25, of Odessa, Tex. won the $12,500 Azalea open in Wilmington, N.C. for $2,200 first prize Apr. 3. Louise Suggs won the $1,000 first prize in the $5,000 women's Oklahoma City open Apr. 3. [See 104E1, 16C1]

Ice Skating: U.S. amateur figure skating championships in Colorado Springs were won by Tenley Albright (women's Apr. 1), Hayes Alan Jenkins (men's Apr. 2), Ray Sato & Barbara Stein of Los Angeles (silver dance pair Apr. 2), Mr. & Mrs. Edward Bodel of Berkeley, Calif. (gold dance pair Apr. 3). [See p. 64A1] . . . **Skiing:** U.S. giant slalom title at Barrier Mt. (Seattle) Apr. 3: won by Ralph Miller of Hanover, N.H. [See p. 104F1] . . . **Soccer:** England won the British championship by defeating Scotland, 7-2, in London Apr. 2. [See p. 104F1] . . . **Swimming:** Bob Gawboy, 22, of Minnesota U. set an unofficial world record of 2 min. 38.8 sec. in the 220-yd. breaststroke event of the Natl. AAU championships in New Haven, Conn. Apr. 1. Ford Konno won the 440-yd. free-style race in U.S.-record time of 4 min. 28.1 sec. Apr. 2. New Haven Swim Club retained the team title. (Mary Kok, 14, of Holland set a world record of one min. 6.1 sec. for the 100-yd. butterfly stroke event in Hilversum, Holland Apr. 3.) [See p. 104G1]

Tennis: Richard (Pancho) Gonzales, 26, of Los Angeles retained the U.S. professional title in Cleveland Apr. 2 by defeating Francisco (Pancho) Segura in the finals of a tourney played under table tennis scoring rules (one serve, at least 21 pts. & a 2-pt. lead required to win a set) [see Vol. XIV, p. 83A3]. Tony Trabert & Darlene Hard (Montevello, Calif.) won singles, Trabert & Vic Seixas won men's doubles in finals of the Puerto Rican invitational tourney in San Juan Apr. 3. [See p. 104G1] . . . **Track:** Wes Santee set a new U.S. outdoor mile run record of 4 min. 0.5 sec. in the Texas Relays in Austin Apr. 2. Oklahoma A&M won the meet team championship. [See p. 104A2] . . . **Wrestling:** William Kerslake, 25, of Cleveland, 289 lb., an aeronautical researcher, retained the heavyweight free-style & Greco-Roman titles in the Natl. AAU tourney in Amityville, N.Y. April 2-3. . . . Ft. Campbell, Ky. won the team title. [See p. 104G1]. . . **Yachting:** Navy won the eastern intercoll. McMillan Cup Regatta at Annapolis, Md. Apr. 3.

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Pacific Coast League baseball season opened Apr. 2. [See Vol. XIV, p. 312G2] . . . **Major league player** representatives meeting in Cincinnati Apr. 5 recommended that the rule against spring training before Mar. 1 be amended so that players could report to training camps at an earlier date voluntarily. [See p. 72B2] . . . **Baseball player trade:** pitchers Ewell Blackwell, 32, & Tom Gorman, 29, and first baseman Dick Kryhoski, 30, were sold to Kansas City by the N.Y. Yankees Mar. 30 [see p. 72B2]. Alpha Brazle, 40, ex-St. Louis Cardinal & Chicago White Sox pitcher, signed with Sacramento (PCL) Apr. 2. Philadelphia (NL) released outfielder John Wyrostek, 36, Mar. 31. . . . **Western Interprovincial Football Union** of Canada announced in Winnipeg Apr. 3 it had adopted a rule against signing players under contract or option to U.S. Natl. Football League teams. [See p. 104C2] . . . **N.Y. State Legislature** passed Apr. 2 a bill to authorize formation of a single non-profit horse racing association in the state to operate a rebuilt Belmont Park & one other track in NYC (Jamaica or Aqueduct) and the one at Saratoga.

MISCELLANEOUS

Disasters. Deaths in the worst Philippine earthquake of the century Apr. 1 were placed at 432 by the Philippine News Service Apr. 4. 2,000 persons were reported injured & 11,500 left homeless after a 7-hr. series of quakes felt on Mindanao, Negros, Panay, Samar, Cebu, Leyte & Bohol Islands. U.S. planes, based in the Philippines flew aid to disaster areas. [See Vol. XIV, p. 232G1] . . . At least 38 persons, including 22 children, died Apr. 3 in a cinema fire in Sclessin, Belgium. The audience of 300 stampeded when a kerosene heating reservoir exploded. . . . 13 persons were killed & about 90 injured Apr. 3 when 3 railroad passenger cars fell into Colima State's "Canyon of Death" while en route from Guadalajara to Manzanillo, Mexico.

(Blizzard in the northern Rocky Mtn. & New England areas Apr. 3-4 brought snowfall 31 in. deep in Sheridan, Wyo., 24 in. deep in northwestern Connecticut and 18 in. deep in northern Utah.) [See p. 104F2]

Crime. Minot Frazier (Mickey) Jelke, 25, former "cafe society" figure in New York, was found guilty Mar. 31 by a Gen. Sessions Court jury in New York after his retrial on 2 counts of compulsory prostitution. He was convicted of having (a) induced Pat Ward (Sandra Wisotsky), 21, to become a prostitute & give him most of her earnings and (b) tried to induce Marguerite Cordova, 27, to do the same in 1951-52. Judge Francis L. Valente postponed sentencing until Apr. 28. [See Vol. XIV, p. 436B3]

4 bandits robbed a Chase Manhattan Bank branch in the Woodside (Queens) section of New York Apr. 6 of $305,243 in cash (believed to be the largest cash loot ever taken in a U.S. bank robbery). . . . 11 persons were killed Apr. 5 in a shooting melee started by a drunken spectator at a cockfight in Petatlan, Mexico.

Dr. Samuel H. Sheppard's attorneys filed an appeal from his life sentence for the murder of his wife, Marilyn, in Cleveland Apr. 2. They said there was new evidence that she was beaten to death by a lefthanded housebreaker who tried to rape her. [See p. 40F3; Vol. XIV, 428A2]

Henry W. (The Dutchman) Grunewald, 62, of Chevy Chase, Md., & attorney Max Halperin, 70, of New York received 5-yr. federal prison sentences in New York Apr. 1 for conspiracy to "fix" tax claims against Patullo Modes, Inc., & the Gotham Beef Co. Grunewald also was fined $10,000, Halperin $8,000. They & Daniel A. Bolich, 54, of Brooklyn, ex-Asst. Internal Revenue Commissioner, were convicted Mar. 28. Co-defendants acquitted: Max Steinberg, 58, of Beverly Hills, Calif., & Harry T. Scherm, 46, of Williston Park, N.Y. [See Vol. XIV, p. 360D3]

Michigan State Police reported Mar. 27 that an attempt to sell photographs of designs of future Gen. Motors cars had been prevented. Dep. Sheriff Elmer E. Bolia, 27, of East Detroit, policeman Thomas Robertson, 32, of Roseville & Richard Declaire, 23, of Roseville were arrested in connection with the investigation. Bolia was dismissed & Robertson suspended.

The U.S. Court of Appeals in New York upheld Apr. 5 the conviction of Frank Costello, 62, on 2 of 3 counts of federal income tax evasion (in 1948-49). It confirmed his 5-yr. prison sentence but reduced his fine from $30,000 to $20,000. [Vol. XIV, 168A3, 412B3]

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New York City population reached a record 8,050,000 Dec. 31, 1954, the N.Y. City Planning Comm. estimated Apr. 3. It reported: a rise to 485,000 (from 246,306 when the 1950 census was taken) in the city's Puerto Rican colony; a decrease of 165,000 in the white population to 6,889,394; an increase of 84,000 in the non-white, non-Puerto Rican population to 840,000. [See Vol. XI, p. 256J] . . . **Dr. Jean (Jack) Horner**, 27, a divorced Church of Amer. Science minister, was deported to the U.S. from Prestwick, Scotland Apr. 3 after he & Pamela Kirk, 19, orphaned English music student, had gone to Scotland in hopes of being married there. Her legal guardian (Thos. Coram Foundtn.) had opposed the marriage and obtained a court order restricting her to England.

Married: actress Olivia De Havilland, 38, & Pierre Galante, 45, film reporter for *Paris-Match;* Apr. 2 in Yvoy-le-Marron, France (her 2d, his first). [See Vol. XII, p. 276P] . . . **Divorced:** film producer Sam Spiegel, 51, by actress Lynne Baggett, 28; Mar. 31 in Santa Monica, Calif. [See p. 103B1]

YALTA CONFERENCE

Summary of Malta & Yalta Papers

(Excerpts & digests of State Dept. documents relating to conferences held by: U.S. Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt & British Prime Min. Winston Churchill at Malta in the Mediterranean Feb. 2, 1945; Roosevelt, Churchill & Soviet Premier Joseph V. Stalin near Yalta in the Crimea Feb. 4-11, 1945)

Introduction. The Malta Conf. was "designed primarily to coordinate American & British views on . . important problems which were expected to come up with the Russians at Yalta."

Pre-Conference Views

American Policy Toward Spheres of Influence. *(From briefing book U.S. State Secy. Edw. R. Stettinius Jr. gave FDR Jan. 18, 1945):* Britain & the USSR contemplated that Rumanian & Bulgarian affairs be made Russia's "main concern," Greek affairs Britain's "main concern" and the USSR & Britain have "roughly an equal position" in Yugoslavia. Churchill, learning of U. S. "misgivings concerning the proposal," suggested to FDR "that the arrangement be given a 3-months' trial, subject then to review by" the U. S., USSR & Britain. FDR assented. The U. S. later informed Russia that "our assent to the trial period . . . was given in consideration of the present war strategy." Otherwise, the U. S. feared the proposal might lead to the Balkans' division into "spheres of influence." The U. S. did not want "any temporary arrangement . . . to appear to be a departure from" the Moscow Conf.* rejection of the spheres of influence idea."

Treatment of Germany. *(From Sept. 20, 1944 memo by H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Director of the State Dept.'s Office of European Affairs):* Treasury Secy. Henry Morgenthau Jr., discussing the Quebec Conf., said: Churchill, at a Sept. 13 dinner meeting, "violently opposed" [the so-called "Morgenthau plan" to transform Germany from an industrial to a primarily agricultural economy]. Churchill said it meant "England would be chained to a dead body [Germany]." Morgenthau, however, convinced Lord Cherwell, British Paymaster General, and Cherwell in turn convinced Churchill. "The proposal apparently appealed to the Prime Minister on the basis that Great Britain would thus acquire a lot of Germany's iron & steel markets & eliminate a dangerous competitor." Churchill then dictated the understanding. British Forgn. Secy. Anthony Eden arrived Sept. 14, "was very much upset at the decision" and had "a heated discussion" with Churchill. Churchill said "he was bent on pushing it through" [see Vol. XIII, p. 386E2; X, 97K; IV, 297P]. (Morgenthau also said: FDR was prepared to accept Churchill's "thesis without question" in regard to U. S. lend-lease to Britain; Morgenthau "had insisted" that a committee "work it out," although he seemed to doubt that it would be very effective in obtaining British "cooperation" on economic matters; FDR "at no time raised any question as to what policy the British should pursue in return to our lend-lease assistance." Matthews' memo said State Secy. Cordell Hull "expressed his shocked feelings at the way such vital matters were settled.") [See Vol. IV, p. 298C]

(From Sept. 29, 1944 memo by FDR to Hull): No "good purpose would be served" by sounding out Britain or Russia on treatment of German industry "in the present stage." "No one wants to make Germany a wholly agricultural nation again, and yet somebody down the line has handed this out to the press. . . . I just cannot go along with the idea of seeing the British Empire collapse financially, and Germany at the same time building up a potential rearmament machine. . . . No one wants 'complete eradication of German industrial productive capacity in the Ruhr & Saar.'" But "rather completed controls" could be enforced.

(From Sept. 29, 1944 memo by Hull to FDR): Morgenthau's [unpublished] memo on postwar treatment of Germany "is decidedly at variance" with State Dept. "views." FDR's [unpublished] Sept. 15 memo "with the statements of views respecting the Ruhr, Saar, etc. & the conversion of Germany into an agricultural & pastoral country, which was formulated at Quebec," "seems to reflect largely the opinions" of Morgenthau. According to State Dept. views, "the primary & continuing objectives of our economic policy [toward Germany] are: (1) to render Germany incapable of waging war, and (2) to eliminate permanently German economic domination of Europe." To achieve this, "it will be essential (1) to destroy all factories incapable of conversion to peaceful purposes . . . (2) to enforce the conversion of all other plants, (3) to eliminate self-sufficiency by imposing reforms that will make Germany dependent upon world markets, (4) to establish controls over foreign trade & key industries . . . (5) to eliminate the position of power of large industrialists & land-owners." The German people's living standards should "be such as to bring home to them that they have lost the war and to impress on them that they must abandon all their pretentious theories that they are a superior race created to govern the world."

(From Jan. 12, 1945 State Dept. briefing paper): The State Dept. "recommends that this Govt. oppose the forcible partition of Germany."

Soviet Attitudes & Policies. *(From Dec. 2, 1944 letter by Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, chief of U. S. military mission to USSR, forwarded to FDR Jan. 3, 1945 by War Secy. Henry L. Stimson):* "When the Red Army was back on its heels, it was right for us to give them all possible assistance with no questions asked. . . . However, they are no longer back on their heels. . . . The situation has changed, but our policy has not. We still meet their requests to the limit of our ability, and they meet ours to the minimum that will keep us sweet." "We never make a request or proposal . . . that is not viewed with suspicion. They simply cannot understand giving without taking, and . . . even our giving is viewed with suspicion. . . . Each transaction is complete in itself without regard to past favors." "We have obtained some concessions after exerting all the pressure we could assemble. . . . The cost to the Soviet Union . . . was nil compared to the cost of our efforts in their behalf. . . . In our dealings with the Soviet authorities, the U. S. Military Mission has made every approach." "The individual Russian is a likeable person," but "officials dare not become too friendly with us, and others are persecuted for this offense." Deane proposed that the U. S.: (1) "continue to assist the Soviet Union, provided they request such assistance, and we are satisfied that it contributes to winning the war"; (2) "insist that they justify their needs for assistance"; (3) "insist on a *quid pro quo*" in all cases where U. S. aid "does not contribute to the winning of the war." . . .

(From Jan. 10, 1945 report by Amb.-to-USSR W. Averell Harriman, forwarded to FDR Jan. 12 by Actg. State Secy. Jos. C. Grew): The Soviets were "eschewing direct attempts to incorporate into the Soviet Union alien peoples who were not embraced within the frontiers of June 21, 1941." But in Eastern Europe & the Balkans, they "are nevertheless employing the wide variety of means at their disposal—occupation troops, secret police, local Communist parties, labor unions, sympathetic leftist organizations, sponsored cultural societies & economic pressure—to assure the establishment of regimes which, while maintaining an outward appearance of independence & of broad popular support, actually depend for their existence on groups responsive to all suggestions emanating from the Kremlin." "The overriding consideration in Soviet foreign policy is the preoccupation with 'security.' . . . This objective explains [such Soviet actions as]: . . . opposition to regional blocs; the sponsorship of puppet regimes in all contiguous countries; the demand for the thorough purge of reactionary elements in all liberated areas, the constant harping at the European neutrals; the demands for vast oil & mineral concessions in Iran." [See Vol. VIII, p. 63B]

Polish Problem. *(From briefing paper):* "We should endeavor to prevent any interim regime from being established which would exclude any major element of the population and threaten to crystallize into a permanent government before the will of the population could become manifest. . . . We should not recognize the [pro-Soviet] Provisional Govt. of Lublin, at least until more conclusive evidence

* Oct. 19-30, 1943. [See Vol. III, p. 348G]

FOR IDENTIFICATION of persons mentioned in this digest see alphabetical directory on p. 117.

is received that it does in fact represent the basic wishes of the Polish people." Evidence indicates that "what prestige [the Lublin Govt.] may have is based, to a considerable extent, on that of the Red Army & the NKVD, the Soviet secret police." The U.S. "should use our full influence to see that the Polish Peasant Party, the largest in the country, & its leader, [Stanislaw] Mikolajczyk [who headed the Polish Govt.-in-exile in London], are given an opportunity to take a leading role in any interim arrangements which may be made."

Unity in China. *(From briefing papers):* "There exist areas of potential discord between our policies & those of the United Kingdom & the USSR toward China." "There is now Kuomintang China, Communist China & puppet China. Kuomintang China is being weakened by dissident elements & widespread popular discontent. Communist China is growing in material & popular strength. Puppet China is filled with pockets of Communist guerrilla resistance. A partial settlement between the Kuomintang & the Communists would not eliminate the fundamental struggle for power. . . . The only hope of preventing civil war & disunity will lie in the creation of a democratic framework within which the opposing groups can reconcile their differences on a political level." Reports said British elements, "out of imperial considerations, desire a weak & possibly disunited China" after the war. "Some apprehension has been voiced lest the Russians may utilize the Chinese Communists to establish an independent or autonomous area in north China & Manchuria. There is nothing in Russia's present attitude as officially disclosed to us to substantiate this."

"Internal disunity, economic instability . . . lack of supplies & general war weariness are greatly impeding China's war efforts. It is this Govt.'s policy to support & encourage all measures designed to resolve these difficulties. . . . Our Ambassador is endeavoring to promote greater internal unity, including the reconciliation of the fundamental differences between the Chungking Govt. & the Communist group." As a "long-range" objective, the U.S. favored "no political faction" but continued "to support the existing Govt. of China as the central authority recognized by the Chinese people, and we look for the establishment within its framework of the unified & effective type of government that is needed." "Should these expectations fail of achievement & the authority of the existing Govt. disintegrate, we would . . . regard sympathetically any Govt. or movement which gave promise of achieving unity & of contributing to peace & security in eastern Asia." The U.S. would try to end mistrust between China & the USSR and "would interpose no objection" to "voluntary" arrangements to facilitate Soviet trade through Manchuria, "including the possible designation by the Chinese Govt. of a free port." "We would welcome the restoration by Great Britain of Hong Kong to China." "We believe that China's territorial integrity should be respected, including her claim to sovereign rights over such outlying territories as Tibet & Outer Mongolia."

Soviet Entry Into War Against Japan. *(From Oct. 4, 1944 telegram by FDR to Harriman):* Harriman was told to give Stalin a message saying FDR completely accepted Stalin's "assurances [unexplained]" about Russia entering the war against Japan.

(From Oct. 10, 1944 telegram by Harriman to FDR): "We nonw have a full agreement from Stalin not only to participate in the Pacific War but to enter the war with full effort."

(From Oct. 11, 1944 telegram by Harriman to FDR): Churchill had agreed that in a subsequent talk with Stalin, "the primary objective . . . should be for us to draw Stalin out on . . . how soon after the collapse of Germany Stalin will be ready to take active measures against Japan & in general what Russia's capabilities will be."

(From Oct. 15, 1944 memo by Deane to U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff): Deane reported that at a meeting with Churchill, Stalin, Harriman & others Oct. 14, he (Deane) pressed Stalin on Russia's entry into the war against Japan [see p. 50F3; Vol. V, 251A; IV, 338E]. (Deane also said Stalin "suggested the possibility of an invasion [of France] through Switzerland in order to outflank the Siegfried Line.")

From Dec. 30, 1944 memo by Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, Manhattan District [A-bomb] Project commander, to Gen. Geo. C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff): "It is now reasonably certain that our operation plans should be based on the gun type bomb" with power equal to about 10,000 tons of TNT. The first A-bomb was expected to be ready about Aug. 1, 1945, the 2d "by the end of the year." Hopes for "an implosion (compression) type of bomb" by "late spring have been dissipated by scientific difficulties." "The time has now come" for top military officers involved to get "sufficient information" to formulate plans & make troop movements. [See Vol. V, pp. 243K-244D]

Kurile Islands. *(From Dec. 28, 1944 memo by State Dept.'s Div. of Territorial Studies, prepared by Geo. H. Blakeslee):* ". . . It is recommended that: (1) The southern Kuriles should be retained by Japan. . . . (2) The northern & central Kuriles should be placed under the projected international organization, which should designate the Soviet Union as administering authority, and (3) In any case," consideration should go to Japan retaining fishing rights in "waters of the northern group."

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CONFERENCE ARRANGEMENTS

FDR urged Stalin in a July 17, 1944 message to meet with him (FDR) & Churchill. He said Churchill was "in hearty accord." He suggested that they meet Sept. 10-14 in north Scotland. Stalin replied July 22 that he considered a meeting desirable but could not leave the country with his armies fighting on a wide front.

Harriman informed FDR Sept. 24 that Stalin was recovering from the grippe and his doctors would not let him travel to the Mediterranean—a site Harriman had suggested.

Deane told the Joint Chiefs of Staff in an Oct. 17 message that, according to Stalin: Presidential Asst. Harry L. Hopkins had told Soviet Amb.-to-U.S. Andrei A. Gromyko that FDR was "anxious" to meet Stalin in the Black Sea area; Stalin agreed "to do so toward the end of November."

Stalin told FDR in an Oct. 19 message that he would "welcome" a November meeting at the Black Sea as, he said, Hopkins had proposed.

FDR asked Churchill in an Oct. 22 message whether he thought it "possible to get U.J. [Uncle Joe, i.e. Stalin] to come to Athens or Cyprus." Churchill replied Oct. 23: "U.J.'s doctors do not like him flying and I suppose there would be the same difficulties in Russian warships coming out of the Black Seas as of American & British warships coming in. One way would be for Turkey to declare war, which I expect she would be very willing to do. But I am not at all sure that the Russians would welcome this [since they want] revision of the Treaty of Montreux."

FDR told Churchill in a Nov. 2 message that Stalin insisted on the Black Sea site but that he (Roosevelt) did "not wish to go to the Black Sea if it can be avoided." Churchill, in a Nov. 5 reply, called the Black Sea "out of the question." FDR said in a Nov. 14 message to Churchill that he thought a meeting "just now may be a little less valuable" than after his Jan. 20 inauguration. He suggested in a Nov. 18 message to Stalin that they meet about Jan. 28-30 at an Adriatic or Mediterranean site.

FDR told Churchill in a Nov. 18 telegram that he did not want the French Provisional Govt. at 'our next conference as such a debating society would confuse our essential issues." He told Churchill in a Dec. 23 message that he was asking Harriman's opinion of "this plan": "If Stalin cannot manage to meet us in the Mediterranean, I am prepared to go to the Crimea and have the meeting at Yalta. . . . I still hope the military situation will permit Marshal Stalin to meet us half way." Harriman replied Dec. 26, after a conference with Soviet Forgn. Min. Vyacheslav M. Molotov, that he was "convinced" Stalin would not go to the Mediterranean. Harriman reported in a Dec. 27 message that he had told Molotov of FDR's agreement to go to Yalta.

FDR told Churchill in a Dec. 30 message that he planned to leave for the meeting as soon as possible after inauguration. Churchill said in a Dec. 31 message to FDR that he was taking Jan. 28 "as target date for arrival of [his party's] ships." Roosevelt suggested in a Dec. 31 message to Churchill that he (FDR) might transfer from ship to plane at Malta and remain there overnight. Churchill,

assuring FDR Jan. 1, 1945 of a welcome at Malta: "No more let us falter. From Malta to Yalta. Let nobody alter." Roosevelt Jan. 3 accepted Churchill's suggestion of "Argonaut" as code name for the Yalta Conf.

FDR instructed Harriman in a Jan. 6 message to tell Stalin "that I [FDR] have told Churchill that I will meet with him & Stalin at Yalta on the 2d of Feb." Stettinius (then State Secy.) told Harriman in a Jan. 15 message that he was bringing State Dept. officials H. Freeman Matthews & Alger Hiss with him to Yalta. Hiss was coming "for Dumbarton Oaks [UN] matters."

The Yalta Conference

Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting held Feb. 4 (Sunday), 1945. (*From minutes of Chas. E. Bohlen, Asst. to the State Secy. & FDR's interpreter at the conference):* FDR, commenting on German destruction in the Crimea, said it made him "more bloodthirsty" than a year ago. He hoped Stalin "would again propose a toast to the execution of 50,000 [German Army] officers." Stalin replied that destruction was worse in Ukraine, where the Germans had destroyed "with method & calculation." Stalin said "the Germans were savages and seemed to hate with a sadistic hatred the creative work of human beings." FDR "agreed."

Stalin said Gen. Charles de Gaulle of France "was unrealistic in the sense that France had not done very much fighting in this war and de Gaulle demanded full rights with the Americans, British & Russians, who had done the burden of the fighting." FDR "described his conversation with de Gaulle in Casablanca 2 years ago, when de Gaulle compared himself with Joan of Arc as the spiritual leader of France & with Clemenceau as the political leader." Stalin said de Gaulle had told him "the Rhine was the natural boundary of France and he wished to have French troops placed there in permanency."

FDR told Stalin "something . . . he would not wish to say . . . in front of" Churchill—that Britain proposed "artificially building up France into a strong power which would have 200,000 troops on the eastern border of France to hold the line for the period required to assemble a strong British Army. He said the British were a peculiar people and wished to have their cake & eat it, too."

FDR "said he had had a good deal of trouble with the British in regard to [German] zones of occupation." FDR preferred to have "the northwest zone, which would be independent of communications through France, but the British seemed to think that the Americans should restore order in France and then return political control to the British." FDR said "he thought it was not a bad idea" for France to get a German occupation zone, but "only out of kindness."

First Plenary Meeting Feb. 4. (*From Bohlen's minutes):* The session was devoted to the European war, which was progressing satisfactorily from the Allied viewpoint. Stalin said Soviet leaders "not only fulfilled formal obligations" in the war "but went farther and acted on what they conceived to be their moral duty to their allies." FDR "thoroughly agreed."

(From Joint Chiefs of Staff minutes): Stalin said the British & Americans neither had demanded nor pressed the Russians to launch a winter offensive but that the Russians "had staged their winter offensive because they felt it . . . their duty to their allies." Churchill said the British & Americans had not bargained with Stalin "because of their faith in him & in the Russian people & the realization that they could be depended on to do the right thing."

Tripartite Dinner Meeting later Feb. 4 *(From Bohlen's minutes):* Stalin "made it quite plain . . . that he felt that the 3 great powers, which had borne the brunt of the war & had liberated . . . the small powers, should have the unanimous right to preserve the peace of the world. . . . He said that it was ridiculous to believe that Albania would have an equal voice with the 3 great powers." He said "he was prepared in concert with the U. S. & Great Britain to protect the rights of the small powers but that he would never agree to having any action of any of the great powers submitted to the judgment of the small powers."

FDR "agreed that the great powers bore the greater responsibility and that the peace should be written by the 3 powers represented at this table." Churchill said "there was no question of the small powers dictating to the big powers but that the great nations . . . should discharge their moral responsibility & leadership and should exercise their power with moderation & great respect for the rights of the smaller nations."

Soviet Dep. Forgn. Commissar Andrei Y. Vishinsky told Bohlen "that the American people should learn to obey their leaders." Bohlen said he would like to see Vishinsky tell that to Americans, and Vishinsky replied that "he would be glad to do so."

Churchill "said that although he was constantly being 'beaten up' as a reactionary, he was the only representative present who could be thrown out at any time by [a vote] of his own people and that personally he gloried in that danger."

After Stalin & FDR left, Churchill told Eden & Stettinius "that he was inclined to the Russian view on [UN Security Council] voting procedure because he felt that everything depended on the unity of the 3 great powers . . . anything that deserved (preserved?)* that unity would have his vote." Eden "took vigorous exception to the Prime Minister and pointed out that there would be no attraction or reason and that he personally believed it would find no support among the English public." Churchill disagreed, citing international "realities."

Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting Feb. 5. *(From Joint Chiefs minutes):* Military representatives of the 3 powers discussed war plans. Fleet Adm. Wm. D. Leahy, FDR's chief of staff, said plans should be based on July 1 as "probable date . . . for the earliest possible collapse of Germany." Marshall said the U. S. & British Chiefs of Staff agreed on July 1 as the earliest "likely" date for Germany's defeat but "differed by 2 months" on the latest likely date, the U. S.' assumption being Dec. 31. Army Gen. Alexei E. Antonov, Soviet Army First Dep. Chief of Staff, regarded "the summer as the earliest date & the winter as the latest" but said July 1 "should be a reasonably certain date . . . if all our efforts were applied to this end."

2d Plenary Session Feb. 5. *(From Bohlen's minutes):* Stalin, Churchill & FDR agreed that Germany would be "dismembered" after surrender but that details should be worked out later. Churchill said it was not necessary to discuss the matter with the Germans, that "he did not feel there was any need to discuss with any German any question about their future—that unconditional surrender gave us the right to determine the future of Germany." Under unconditional surrender terms, "we reserve . . . all rights over the lives, property & activities of the Germans," Churchill said.

Stalin proposed adding to the surrender terms "a clause stating that Germany would be dismembered" but giving no details. The advantage of saying this in advance of surrender, Stalin held, was that it "would facilitate acceptance by the whole German people of what was in store for them." FDR agreed, but Churchill warned that such an announcement might "stiffen" German resistance. FDR & Stalin replied that "there was no question of making the decision public."

Stalin said that during de Gaulle's visit to Moscow, "the French had made it quite plain that they intended to annex permanently [German] territory up to the Rhine."

Churchill opposed discussion of possible border changes but proposed giving France a German occupation zone "which could come out of the British & possibly the American zones." Stalin asked whether this might "serve as a precedent to other states" and whether this would change "tripartite control of Germany to a 4-nation control." Churchill replied that Britain expected only France to join the Big 3 in the control machinery. Stalin objected to this, but Churchill insisted. He said Britain "did not wish to bear the whole weight of an attack by Germany in the future and for this reason they would like to see France strong & in possession of a large army." He agreed with Stalin that "France had not been much help in the war" but insisted that Britain needed France in case of any future German aggression.

FDR favored a zone for France but agreed with Stalin that "France should not take part in" control. (FDR predicted that Congress would not let him keep U. S. troops in Europe "much more than 2 years" after the war.)

* Bohlen's query

Soviet Dep. Forgn. Commissar Ivan M. Maisky outlined this Soviet plan for German reparations: "Reparations in kind" were to be in 2 categories— (1) "the removal from the national wealth of Germany of plants, machine tools, rolling stock, etc. to be completed [by] 2 years after the end of hostilities"; (2) "yearly payments in kind to last for 10 years." "In order to restore the Soviet economy . . . & to safeguard the future security of Europe, it would be necessary to reduce German heavy industry by 80%. . . . Specialized industry useful only for military purposes should be 100% removed. In this category would fall all aviation factories, synthetic oil refineries, etc." Priorities for reparations should be according to a nation's contributions to the war & its material losses. Soviet reparations would total $10 billion.

Churchill, basing his opinion on World War I reparations experience, said he felt the USSR "would get nowhere near the sum" Maisky had mentioned. He saw no benefit to Britain in large reparations from Germany even though "there would be no victorious country so burdened in an economic sense" as Britain.

FDR said the U. S. had lent Germany more than $10 billion after World War I "and that this time we would not repeat our past mistakes." German property sequestered in the U. S. had been turned back to the German owners after World War I. But this time, FDR pledged, he would seek legislation to retain for the U. S. all German property in America. FDR said he would help Russia get "the reparations in kind which she required, as well as German manpower to reconstruct the devastated regions, but he felt that the Germans should be allowed to live [so] they might not become a burden on the world."

3d Plenary Meeting Feb. 6. *(From Bohlen's minutes):* FDR said he thought U. S. public opinion would support an international organization and that this might change the U. S. attitude on keeping troops in Europe.

Stettinius discussed a proposal for UN Security Council voting, made by FDR in messages to Churchill & Stalin Dec. 5, 1944, which called for (a) "unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all major decisions relating to the preservation of peace, including all economic & military enforcement measures"; (b) giving any sovereign member state involved in a dispute "a right to present its case."* Churchill found this "entirely satisfactory." Stalin, however, warned that small nations would not be satisfied to present their cases and then see big nations veto any decisions adverse to a big power.

Stalin said future peace was a "more serious question" than voting procedure or domination of the world by 3 powers. "As long as the 3 of them lived, none of them would involve their countries in aggressive actions," he declared. But he warned that they could be dead in 10 years and succeeded by "a new generation . . . not knowing the horrors of the present war." Therefore, he saw an "obligation to create . . . such an organization as would secure peace for at least 50 years. He said the main thing was to prevent quarrels . . . between the 3 great powers and that the task, therefore, was to secure their unity for the future. The covenant of the new world organization should have this as its primary task" because "the greatest danger was conflict between the 3 great powers." Small nations complaining against big ones would find "friends" & "protectors," and this might cause conflict which could break Big 3 unity, Stalin said.

FDR & Churchill agreed on the Curzon Line as Poland's eastern border but suggested that the USSR might be willing to make a magnanimous concession of Lwow (Lvov) to Poland. They indicated that they were mainly concerned in Poland becoming independent, with a representative government.

Stalin replied that "Russia had many past grievances against Poland" and that strategic security was involved because "throughout history Poland had been the corridor for attack on Russia." The latter situation was caused by Poland's weakness, and therefore "Russia wants a strong, independent & democratic Poland." Stalin said the Curzon line was established against Russian will by Georges Clemenceau & George Curzon. He could agree on the Curzon Line but not to Lwow concessions, he said. But he proposed compensating Poland at Germany's expense by making Poland's western border the Neisse River.

Stalin refused to have anything to do with creating a Polish Govt. at Yalta because that could not be done without Polish participation. He said the Warsaw or Lublin Govt. had showed it could maintain order whereas the London Govt. was composed of trouble-makers. As a military man, Stalin said he could not have civil war in his rear and therefore "will support the Govt. which gives us peace in the rear." Churchill replied that his Govt. could not recognize the Lublin Govt.

4th Plenary Meeting Feb. 7. *(From Bohlen's minutes):* Stalin said he had received FDR's letter suggesting that 2 representatives of the Lublin Govt. & 2 representatives of "other elements of Polish public opinion" be called to Yalta in an effort "to settle the question of a new interim government for Poland which would be pledged to hold free elections when conditions permitted." Stalin said he had been unable to contact the Lublin Poles and did not think he could reach the others in time for the Yalta Conf.

Molotov said Russia "would be satisfied with the admission of 3 or at least 2 of the Soviet republics"— Ukraine, White [Byelo-] Russia & Lithuania—as original UN members. He compared their claims with those of British Commonwealth nations. Molotov withdrew the USSR's objections to the U.S.' proposals for UN Security Council voting. FDR suggested that they call a conference to form the world organization and that Soviet membership claims be considered either at the conference or after the organization was in operation. Churchill said his view on membership of British dominions caused him to have "great sympathy with the Soviet request." He said he was glad FDR's answer was "in no way . . . a final negation." He said he would have to discuss the matter with his Govt.

Molotov read these Soviet proposals on the Polish question: (1) Poland's eastern frontier would be the Curzon Line "with a digression from it in some regions of 5-8 km. in favor of Poland"; (2) Poland's western frontier "should be traced from the town of Stettin (Polish) & farther to the south along the River Oder & still farther along the River Neisse (western)"; (3) "it was deemed desirable to add to the Provisional Polish Govt. some democratic leaders from Polish emigré circles"†; (4) the enlarged Provisional Polish Govt. should be recognized by the Allied Govts.; (5) the enlarged Provisional Polish Govt. should call elections "as soon as possible" to organize "permanent organs of the Polish Govt."; (6) Molotov, Harriman & British Amb.-to-USSR Sir Archibald Clark Kerr were to discuss enlargement of the Provisional Polish Govt. & were to submit their proposals to the 3 Govts.

Churchill said "he would always support the movement of Polish frontiers to the West since he felt they [the Poles] should receive compensation, but not more than they could handle." He said many Britons "would be shocked" at moving "large numbers of Germans" but that "he personally would not be shocked." "He felt if it were confined to East Prussia, 6 million Germans probably could be handled quite aside from moral grounds, but the addition of the line west of the Neisse would create quite a problem." Stalin replied "that most Germans in those areas had already run away from the Red Army." Churchill said this "simplified the problem" and that there would be "space in Germany for these deported persons" because Germany had 6-7 million war casualties and probably would have a million more.

Foreign Ministers' Meeting Feb. 8. *(From minutes of Edw. Page Jr., official at U. S. Embassy in Moscow & secretary-interpreter at Yalta):* Stettinius said the Dumbarton Oaks proposals provided for each sovereign state to have one UN vote and he could not see how they could be amended "to provide for multiple participation" although he thought the Soviet request "deserved sympathetic consideration." Eden said "he was sympathetically inclined to the Soviet position" on including Soviet republics in the organization "and would be ready to say so at whatever was considered to be an

* Stettinius spoke from a memo presumably prepared by Hiss. [See p. 89E2]

† The words "& from inside Poland" were added in subsequent discussions.

Personalities Mentioned in Summary of Yalta Conference Papers

ANTONOV, Army Gen. Alexei E.—Soviet Army's First Deputy Chief of Staff
BLAKESLEE, Geo. H.—consultant to U.S. State Dept.'s Div. of Territorial Studies
BOHLEN, Chas. E.—Asst. to U.S. State Secy., Pres. Roosevelt's interpreter at Yalta Conf.
CHERWELL, Lord—British Paymaster-General
CHIANG Kai-shek, Generalissimo—President of China
CHURCHILL, Winston Leonard Spencer—British Prime Min., First Lord of the Treasury, Defense Min.
CLEMENCEAU, Georges B.—French Premier 1906-09, 1917-20
CURZON, Geo. Nathaniel, Marquess Curzon of Kedleston—British Forgn. Secy. 1919-24
DEANE, Maj. Gen. John R.—comdr. U.S. Military Mission to USSR
De GAULLE, Gen. Chas.—pres. of Provisional French Govt.'s Council of Ministers
EDEN, Anthony—British Forgn. Secy.
GREW, Jos. C.—U.S. State Undersecy. Dec. 1944-Aug. 1945
GROMYKO, Andrei Andreyevich—Soviet Amb. to U.S.
GROVES, Maj. Gen. Leslie R.—comdr. U.S. Manhattan Dist. (A-bomb) Project
HARRIMAN, Wm. Averell—U.S. Amb. to Soviet Union
HISS, Alger—special asst. to director of U.S. State Dept.'s Special Political Affairs Office May-Oct. 1944; deputy director Special Political Affairs Office Nov. 1944-Mar. 1945; director Special Political Affairs Office Mar. 1945-Jan. 1947
HOPKINS, Harry L.—Special Asst. to Pres. Roosevelt
HULL, Cordell—U.S. State Secy. 1933-44
HURLEY, Maj. Gen. Patrick J.—U.S. Amb. to China
KERR, Sir Archibald Clark—British Amb. to Soviet Union
KHUDYAKOV, Aviation Marshal Sergei Viadindrovich—Deputy Chief of Soviet Air Staff
KUTER, Maj. Gen. Laurence S.—U.S. Army Air Forces Asst. Chief of Staff for Plans
LEAHY, Fleet Adm. Wm. D.—Chief of Staff to Pres. Roosevelt
MAISKY, Ivan Mikhailovich—Soviet Deputy Forgn. Commissar
MARSHALL, Gen. of the Army Geo. Catlett—U.S. Army Chief of Staff
MATTHEWS, H. Freeman—deputy director U.S. State Dept.'s European Affairs Office Jan.-Dec. 1944; director European Affairs Office Dec. 1944-Nov. 1946
MIKOLAJCZYK, Stanislaw—Prime Min. of Polish Govt. in London through Nov. 1944, subsequently leader of Polish Peasant Party in exile
MOLOTOV, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich—Soviet Forgn. Commissar
MORGENTHAU Jr., Henry—U.S. Treasury Secy.
PAGE Jr., Edw.—2d secy. & consul at U.S. Embassy in Moscow; secy. & interpreter at Yalta Conf.
ROOSEVELT, Franklin Delano—U.S. President
SAPIEHA, Adam Stephen—Archbishop of Crakow (Poland)
STALIN, Marshal of the Soviet Union Jos. Vissarionovich—Chrmn. of Soviet Council of People's Commissars (Premier)
STETTINIUS Jr., Edw. R.—U.S. State Undersecy. Oct. 1943-Nov. 1944; State Secy. Dec. 1944-June 1945
STIMSON, Henry L.—U.S. War Secy.
SUBASIC, Ivan—Prime Min. of Yugoslav Govt. in London 1944-45
TITO, Marshal (Josip Broz)—Yugoslav Provisional Govt.'s Prime Min. & Natl. Defense Min.
VISHINSKY, Andrei Yanuarevich—Soviet First Deputy Forgn. Commissar
WEDEMEYER, Lt. Gen. Albert C.—commander U.S. Army Forces in China Theater, chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek
WILLKIE, Wendell—Republican Presidential candidate 1940

appropriate moment." Molotov said Soviet constitutional amendments gave Soviet republics the right to contacts with foreign states.

Eden said his Govt. had no objection to Russia's "obtaining Iranian oil concessions if & when the Iranians were prepared to negotiate." He suggested a declaration "which would indicate that the Allies were prepared to start to withdraw their troops [from Iran] earlier than was" expected. Molotov said the troop question involved a treaty with Iran and would take study. He said Soviet-Iranian oil negotiations had broken down and there was no need to discuss the situation then.

(From a U.S. delegation memo): U. S. & British conferees had agreed at Malta—(1) to urge Russia "to respect the decision of the Iranian Govt. to postpone [oil] negotiations . . . until the termination of hostilities & withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran"; (2) to "state that when the truck route to Russia across Iran is no longer needed, we would be prepared to begin removing our troops. . . ."

Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting Feb. 8. *(From Combined Chiefs minutes):* British representatives disclosed that some Dominion Govts. had objected to any agreement whereby their war prisoners would work for the Russians on any but a voluntary basis. The Combined Chiefs agreed that the reciprocal PW agreement being negotiated should provide that such employment would be voluntary.

Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting Feb. 8. *(From Bohlen's minutes):* FDR told Stalin "we hoped to establish bases on the Bonins & on the islands near Formosa. . . . He hoped that it would not be necessary actually to invade the Japanese islands and would do so only if absolutely necessary. The Japanese had 4 million men in their army, and he hoped by intensive bombing to be able to destroy Japan & its army."

Stalin said he did not object to the U. S. having bases at Komsomolsk (on the lower reaches of the Amur) or Nikolaevak (at the Amur's mouth). He said the U. S. would have to wait for bases on Kamchatka because "the presence of the Japanese consul there made it difficult at this time to make the necessary arrangements."

FDR, in reply to a Stalin request, said he was trying to get legislation so that surplus ships the U. S. & Britain did not need after the war could be sold to Russia "on credit without any interest."

FDR said he felt there would be no difficulty in Russia getting south Sakhalin & the Kuriles after the war. He said he had not discussed with Chiang Kai-shek the matter of Russia getting a warm-water port at Dairen and therefore "could not speak for the Chinese." But he suggested that Russia could use the port either by lease from China or by making Dairen a free port under an international commission. FDR also suggested that Russia might use Manchurian railways from Siberia to the warm-water ports by a lease or commission arrangement. Stalin said that without these concessions, "it would be difficult . . . to explain to the Soviet people why Russia was entering the war against Japan."

FDR also expressed a hope that Britain would return Hong Kong to China and that it would become an internationalized free port.

FDR suggested a Soviet-U. S.-Chinese trusteeship for Korea for 20-30 years, and Stalin urged the shortest possible trusteeship period. Stalin approved FDR's opposition to stationing foreign troops in Korea. FDR said he did not feel it "necessary" to invite Britain to participate in a Korean trusteeship but thought the British might "resent" this. Stalin agreed that they would be offended and "felt the British should be invited."

FDR said he favored trusteeship for Indo-China but that Britain wanted to give Indo-China back to France lest it lead to trusteeship for Burma. He said "France had done nothing to improve the [Indo-Chinese] natives since she had the colony."

FDR said Lt. Gen. Albert S. Wedemeyer & Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, new Amb. to China, "were having much more success than their predecessors & had made more progress in bringing the Communists . . . together with the Chungking [Nationalist] Govt. He said the fault lay more with the Kuomintang & the Chungking Govt. than with the so-called Communists." Stalin said Chiang "should assume leadership" to unify the Chinese against Japan.

5th Plenary Meeting Feb. 8 *(From Bohlen's minutes):* Eden, reporting on the Feb. 8 foreign secretaries' meeting, said it had been decided to recommend that the UN conference on a world organization meet Apr. 25 in the U.S. and invite only states which had signed the UN declaration. At the UN conference, it had been decided, British & U.S. delegates "will support the proposal to admit to original membership 2 Soviet Socialist Soviet Republics."

FDR suggested, & Stalin agreed, that only nations which had declared war on Germany by Mar. 1 should be invited to the UN conference. Stalin said this should not apply to exenemies which recently had declared war on Germany. FDR & Churchill agreed. Churchill specifically mentioned Eire as not included. FDR & Churchill assured Stalin that the fact that Ukraine & White Russia had not signed the UN declaration would not be used as "an excuse for excluding them."

Churchill argued against Molotov's proposal that the Lublin Govt. be accepted as a base which, with additions, could be formed into a Polish Govt. that the Big 3 should recognize. Churchill said that, according to his Govt.'s information, the Lublin Govt. "does not commend itself to the overwhelming masses of the Polish people and it is certainly not accepted abroad as representative of the people." He declared that the British people could not accept his Govt.'s brushing aside the London Polish Govt. although he (Churchill) "had no special feeling for the [London Govt.], which in his opinion had been foolish at every stage." Britain could not transfer recognition to another Polish Govt., Churchill said, until it was "convinced that a new government, representative of the Polish people, had been created, pledged to an election on the basis of universal suffrage by secret ballot with the participation of all democratic

parties & the right to put up their candidates." He said his Govt. "had given away completely on the [Polish] frontiers, had accepted the Soviet view and had championed it."

Stalin replied that the sympathies of the Polish people "are with those who stayed" and fought in the underground, "not with those who left." He said the Polish people viewed their liberation by the Red Army as "a great national holiday" in which the London Govt. had taken no part.

In reply to a question by Stalin, Churchill said the Yugoslav king "had been persuaded, or even forced, to agree to a regency," that he (Churchill) "had always made it plain . . . that if the king would not agree to a regency he would be by-passed."

U.S. Proposal on Poland circulated by U.S. delegation among Soviet & British delegations Feb. 8: The U.S. did not object to Soviet proposals on Poland's eastern boundary. As for the west, "while agreeing that compensation should be given to Poland at the expense of Germany, including that portion of East Prussia south of the Koenigsberg Line, Upper Silesia & up to the line of the Oder, there would appear to be little justification to the extension of the [boundary] to the western Neisse River."

The U.S. proposed that the Big 3 invite Lublin & London Polish leaders & Archbishop (of Crakow) Adam Stephen Sapieha to Moscow to form a Polish Govt. on these lines: (1) a 3-man presidential committee would represent the presidential office; (2) this committee would undertake to form a government consisting of representatives of the Warsaw (Lublin) Govt., of "other democratic elements inside Poland" & of "Polish democratic leaders abroad"; (3) the interim government would pledge to hold free elections "as soon as conditions permit for a constituent assembly to establish a new Polish constitution under which a permanent government would be elected; (4) "when a Polish Govt. of national unity is formed, the 3 governments [Big 3] will then proceed to accord it recognition as the provisional government of Poland."

Tripartite Dinner Meeting Feb. 8 *(From Bohlen's minutes):* "45 toasts in all were drunk." Stalin, in a toast to FDR, said he (Stalin) & Churchill "had relatively simple decisions" since "they had been fighting for their very existence against Hitlerite Germany." But FDR, "whose country had not been seriously threatened with invasion . . . had had perhaps a broader conception of national interest . . . [and] had been the chief forger of the instruments which had led to the mobilization of the world against Hitler."

Stalin, toasting the Big 3 alliance, said "it was not so difficult to keep unity in time of war since there was a joint aim to defeat the common enemy. . . . The difficult task came after the war when diverse interests tended to divide the Allies. He said he was confident that the present alliance would meet this test. . . ."

Forgn. Ministers' Meeting Feb. 9 *(From Page's minutes):* Stettinius announced agreement with Molotov's proposal to drop the question of a Polish presidential committee. He therefore withdrew the U.S. suggestion on that point. He said all 3 delegations agreed that the Polish Govt. "should be composed of the present Polish [Lublin] Provisional Govt." plus "representatives of other democratic elements inside Poland & some Polish democratic leaders from abroad." He suggested that the Provisional Govt. be reorganized "into a fully representative government based on all democratic forces in Poland & including democratic leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed 'the Provisional Govt. of Natl. Unity'." It would be pledged to hold free elections as soon as practicable "on the basis of universal suffrage & secret ballot in which all democratic parties would have the right to participate & to put forward candidates." This government, when satisfactorily formed, would be recognized by the Big 3.

Eden said "many people," including himself, were troubled about British acceptance of the Curzon Line. Britons generally did not consider the Lublin Govt. representative of Poland, Eden said, and Britain therefore stressed "a new start" rather than "adding to the Lublin Govt." He declared that the presence of Mikolajczyk in a Polish Govt. "would do more than anything else to add to the authority of that government & to convince the British people of its representative character."

Molotov said that the Russians considered early Polish elections "the most important question" since they "would give a life for a permanent government and do away with all the difficulties." In the current situation, however, the Russians had to protect the Red Army's rear and that was why, Molotov said, he had suggested the Lublin Govt. as the basis for a new Polish Govt.

Eden agreed on the importance of elections but said British opinion would be that elections controlled by the Lublin Govt. "would not be free . . . or represent the will of the Polish people." Stettinius supported this view "in full."

U.S.-Soviet Staff Meeting Feb. 9. *(From minutes of Maj. Gen. Laurence A. Kuter, U.S. Army Air Forces Asst. Chief of Staff for Plans):* Antonov said: Red troops Russia originally planned to send to the Far East in early 1945 were in the center line on the Russian front, therefore their eastward movement would be delayed; after they started eastward, it would take "not less than 3 months" for Russia to build up enough strength to meet a Japanese attack; Russia agreed to USAF operation in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk (eastern Siberia) area; U. S. advance parties could go there without delay; Russia would make "pre-hostility preparations, including construction, reception & storage" of U. S. stockpiles in eastern Siberia & Kamchatka for U. S. air units to be based there; departure of the U. S. party to Kamchatka "must be deferred 'until the last moment'" because its presence in Kamchatka "could not be kept a secret from the Japs"; Russia agreed to the U. S. request for "additional weather reporting stations in Siberia."

After the principal meeting ended, Kuter & Aviation Marshal Sergei V. Khudyakov went over air plans. Kuter saw "no chance of providing" C-54 transport planes for Russia, as Khudyakov requested. It was agreed that the USAF would cut down on C-47s to troop carrier units "in order to make additional C-47s available to the Red Air Force."

6th Plenary Meeting Feb. 9. *(From Bohlen's minutes):* Molotov said the USSR would find Stettinius' proposal on Poland acceptable with these changes: (a) substitution of a statement that the Provisional Govt. "should be reorganized on a wider democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself & from those living abroad" (Stettinius proposed reorganization "into a fully representative government based on all democratic forces in Poland & including democratic leaders from Poland abroad"); (b) calling the government "the Natl. Provisional Govt. of Poland" (Stettinius' name—"the Provisional Govt. of Natl. Unity"); (c) providing that "all non-Fascist & anti-Fascist democratic parties" instead of merely "all democratic parties" could participate in the elections; (d) elimination of a proposal that the Big 3 Ambassadors in Warsaw would observe & report on fulfillment of the pledge of free & unfettered elections (Molotov considered this "offensive to the Poles").

Stettinius said the foreign ministers had "agreed that the 5 governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conf. [in regard to] providing machinery in the World Charter for dealing with territorial trusteeship & dependent areas." Churchill said "he did not agree with one single word," that "he had not been consulted." He said that "under no circumstances would he ever consent to 40 or 50 nations thrusting interfering fingers into the life's existence of the British Empire."

Stettinius explained that this was intended to refer not to the British Empire but "particularly [to] dependent areas which would be taken out of enemy control." Churchill accepted this "but remarked it would be better to say it did not refer to the British Empire."

Churchill said he had given Wendell Willkie a statement to the effect that Atlantic Charter principles already applied to the British Empire. FDR "inquired if that was what had killed Mr. Willkie."

Churchill said "a list of the major [war] criminals . . . should be drawn up here" and "they should be shot once their identity is established" but they should get "a judicial trial." Stalin agreed.

Declaration on Liberated Europe. *(From draft submitted by FDR at Feb. 9 plenary meeting):* ". . . The establishment of order in Europe & the re-building of national economic life must be achieved by processes [enabling] the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism &

fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice."

To foster conditions in which liberated peoples might do so, the Big 3 "will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state . . . where in their judgment conditions require, (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements . . . & pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people, and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections. . . .

"When, in the opinion of the 3 governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite . . . make such action necessary, they will immediately establish appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth."

Forgn. Ministers' Meeting Feb. 9. *(From Bohlen's minutes):* Eden announced that the British War Cabinet had indicated that a Polish settlement on the basis being discussed could not be accepted. He submitted a draft of a "revised formula" which, it was agreed, was "a modification of the American formula to which amendments could be added."

The 3 foreign ministers agreed to a text declaring that "a new situation has been created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army." It said: "The provisional government now functioning in Poland should be reorganized on a broader democratic base with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself & from those living abroad"; this government would "be called the 'Polish Provisional Govt. of Natl. Unity," would be pledged to "free & unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage & secret ballot"; "all democratic & anti-Nazi parties would have the right to take part & to put forth candidates" in the elections.

Forgn. Ministers' Meeting Feb. 10. *(From Page's minutes):* Stettinius announced U. S. willingness to withdraw from the Polish formula a sentence Molotov opposed (requiring the Big 3's Warsaw Ambassadors to observe & report on the elections pledge). Eden dissociated himself from the U. S. proposal to drop the sentence. Molotov suggested that another section be changed to declare that the U.S. & British Govts. "will establish diplomatic relations with the Polish Govt. as has been done by the Soviet Union." (This section had stated that "when a Polish Govt. of Natl. Unity has been formed which the 3 governments can regard as fully representative of the Polish people, the 3 governments will accord it recognition.") Stettinius & Eden rejected the change.

Stettinius announced U. S. rejection of Molotov's proposal to amend the Declaration on Liberated Europe by adding a pledge of "strong support . . . to those people in [liberated] countries who took an active part in the struggle against German occupation." But Stettinius & Eden agreed to Molotov's proposal to substitute the words "they will immediately take measures for the carrying out of mutual consultation" in place of words pledging them to "establish appropriate machinery."

Soviet Entry Into War Vs. Japan. *(From Harriman's Feb. 10 memo):* Molotov gave Harriman a draft of Stalin's political conditions for Russia's entering the war against Japan. It said Russia would enter "2 or 3 months after Germany has surrendered & the war in Europe has ended" provided that: (1) *Status quo* in Outer Mongolia was preserved; (2) these former Russian rights "violated" by Japan's "treacherous attack" in 1904 "should be restored"—(a) southern Sakhalin & all adjacent islands returned to Russia, (b) possession of Port Arthur & Dairen restored on lease, (c) restoration of Russia's pre-Russo-Japanese War rights to operation of Chinese-Eastern & South-Manchurian railroads with China retaining full sovereignty in Manchuria; (3) "the Kurile Islands should be handed over to the Soviet Union." [See p. 114F2]

Harriman proposed these 3 amendments: Item 2 (b) would provide that "possession lease of the port areas of Port Arthur & Dairen enlease should be restored, or these areas should become free ports under international control"; Item 2 (c) would include the words "or these railroads should be placed under the operational control of a Chinese-Soviet commission"; a new paragraph would say that "the agreement concerning the ports & railways . . . required the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek."

These amendments were accepted in conversations among Harriman & Molotov and FDR, Stalin & Harriman with one change. Stalin insisted that Port Arthur would have to be under lease, not a free port, because it was to become a Russian naval base.

7th Plenary Meeting Feb. 10. *(From Bohlen's minutes)*: FDR announced that he had changed his mind about France's position in Germany and now thought France should be on the Control Comm. Stalin agreed.

FDR, Churchill & Stalin agreed to send a telegram to Marshal Tito & Ivan Subasic, head of the London Yugoslav Govt., urging them to put into effect their agreement on a new Yugoslav Govt.

Churchill said his War Cabinet had instructed him "not to mention figures" in discussing German reparations but to leave this to the Moscow Reparations Comm. The Cabinet said the $20 billion figure (Russia to get

Wartime 'Big 3' in Conference at Yalta

Wide World

Winston Churchill (left), Franklin Delano Roosevelt (center) & Joseph Stalin as they appeared in formal conference photo taken at Livadia Palace, Yalta, Feb. 1945. Pres. Roosevelt died April 12, 1945—2 months after this photo was taken. Stalin died March 5, 1953. Churchill, who was voted out of British Prime Ministry in July 1945 (during Potsdam Conf. with Stalin & Pres. Harry S. Truman), regained power in Oct. 1951, remained Prime Minister until retirement this week (April 5) at 80.

Tripartite Decisions at Yalta

(U.S. delegation's list of decisions arrived at by the 3 heads of government at the Crimean Conference; from Hiss collection of documents)

1. "To include the word 'dismemberment' in the German terms of surrender."

2. To appoint an Anglo-U.S.-USSR committee "to study the question of dismemberment."

3. To adopt the U.S.' proposal on voting procedure in the proposed world organization's Security Council.

4. To hold a UN conference in the U.S. Apr. 25 "to prepare the charter of the proposed world organization."

5. To authorize the U.S. on behalf of the 3 powers to consult China & France about Decisions 3 & 4.

6. That the 5 governments with permanent Security Council seats should consult each prior to the UN conference about "providing machinery in the world charter for dealing with territorial trusteeships which would apply only to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territory to be detached from the enemy as a result of this war; (c) any other territory that may voluntarily be placed under trusteeship." Subsequent agreement would decide which territories "would actually be placed under trusteeship." "No discussions of specific territories are contemplated now" or at the UN conference.

7. The U.S. & Britain would support at the UN conference a Soviet request that Ukraine & White Russia be admitted as initial world organization members.

8. "To issue the statement on Poland agreed to at the conference."

9. Immediate establishment in Moscow of a Soviet-Anglo-U.S. commission on German reparations which would be guided by the principles that:"(a) Germany must pay in kind for losses caused by it to the Allied governments; (b) the amount of reparations to be paid by Germany should be considered by the Moscow Reparations Comm. & reported . . . to the 3 governments; (c) the 3 governments will submit to the commission their proposals & data relating to the [reparations] question."

10. "To issue the declaration on liberated Europe agreed to at the conference."

11. To give the French Provisional Govt. a German occupation zone & a seat on the German Control Comm.

12. To send Marshal Tito & Dr. Subasic a joint telegram urging immediate implementation of their agreement (with amendments) for a new Yugoslav Govt.

13. To hold periodic meetings of the Big 3 foreign ministers, the first to be in London in June 1945.

14. That the foreign ministers consider revision of the Montreaux convention at their first meeting.

about half) "was too great," beyond Germany's capacity to pay. Stalin was unable to persuade Churchill to change his mind. FDR & Churchill then adopted this formula proposed by Stalin: (1) the Big 3 "agreed that Germany must pay compensation for the damage caused to the Allied nations as a result of the war"; (2) the Moscow Reparations Comm. would be instructed to consider the amount.

Stalin said the Montreaux Convention on the Dardanelles was outmoded and should be revised. It was agreed that the Big 3 foreign ministers would discuss it and that the Turks would be guaranteed their independence & integrity.

Because of British opposition to naming specific western frontiers for Poland, the Big 3 agreed on a statement recognizing "that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north & west" and suggesting that "final delimitation of the western frontier [should] await the peace conference."

(From Matthews' minutes): FDR said he had "no right to make an agreement on [Polish] boundaries at this time," that it "must be done by the Senate later."

Tripartite Dinner Meeting Feb. 10. *(From Bohlen's minutes):* FDR said that when he became President, the U.S. "was close to revolution because the people lacked food, clothing & shelter, but he had said, 'If you elect me President I will give you these things,' and since then there was little problem in regard to social disorder" in the U.S.

Churchill said "he felt that British opposition to communism was not based on any attachment to private property but to the old question of the individual vs. the state." Stalin said "he did not believe the Labor Party could ever form a Govt. in England." He said he was a Zionist "in principle but recognized the difficulty." He said Russia "had tried to establish a national home for the Jews in Birobidzhan but that they had only stayed there 2 or 3 years and then scattered to the cities."

Stalin "remarked that the Soviet Govt. would never have signed a treaty with the Germans in 1939 had it not been for Munich & the Polish-German treaty of 1934."

8th Plenary Meeting Feb. 11. Most of the conversation concerned the final communiqué. Bohlen's papers contained no full minutes.

Tripartite Luncheon Meeting Feb. 11. *(From Bohlen's notes):* ". . . Stalin made an obvious reference to Iran and stated, in his opinion any nation which kept its oil in the ground and would not let it be exploited was . . . 'working against peace.'"

Forgn. Ministers' Meeting Feb. 11. *(From working draft of protocol of proceedings revised by foreign ministers, from Hiss' collection of documents):* Among conclusions reached:

A UN conference on the proposed world organization would be summoned for Apr. 25 in the U.S. Nations invited: (a) the UN as they existed Feb. 8, (b) such Associated Nations as declared war by Mar. 1. When the conference is held, the British & U.S. delegations "will support a proposal to admit to original membership . . . Ukraine & White Russia." The U.S. was to consult China & France about world organization decisions taken at the Crimean (Yalta) Conf. The invitations to the UN Conf. would provide that (1) each Security Council member should have one vote, (2) Security Council decisions "on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of 7 members," (3) Security Council decisions "on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of 7 members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that . . . a party to a dispute should abstain. . . ."

German surrender terms would be amended to say that Britain, the U.S. & USSR "shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. . . . They will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarization & dismemberment of Germany, as they deem requisite for future peace & security." France was to get a German occupation zone "formed out of the British & American zones," and the French Provisional Govt. was to be invited "to become a member of the Allied Control Comm. for Germany." A Reparations Comm. composed of one representative each from the U.S., USSR & Britain was to be set up in Moscow. (No reparations figure was stated.)

UN Voting. *(From Feb. 10 message by FDR to Stalin):* FDR foresaw "possible political difficulties" in the U.S. as a result of his agreeing to Ukrainian & White Russian membership in the UN Assembly—giving the USSR 3 votes to the U.S.' one. "It may be necessary for me . . . to ask for additional votes" to assure that Congress & the U.S. people accept U.S. participation in the world organization. "I would like to know . . . that you would . . . support a proposal along this line."

(From Feb. 10 message by FDR to Churchill): ". . . I understand . . . that you would have no objection if I found it necessary to work out some way of giving the United States additional votes" in the UN Assembly. "I hope . . . you can give me your agreement. . . ."

(From Feb. 11 message by Churchill to FDR): ". . . I need hardly assure you that I should do everything possible to assist you in this matter."

(From Feb. 11 message by Stalin to FDR): ". . . I entirely agree with you. . . . I think that the number of votes for the U.S.A. might be increased to 3. . . . I am prepared officially to support this proposal."